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SYNOPSIS 
This paper analyses the future of the future doctrine on the Internet. As copyright 
material becomes increasingly digitised, tensions have arisen between those 
controlling and using such material. Although digital technology provides significant 
benefits in disseminating copyright material, the fact that digitised material may be 
easily reproduced or manipulated, and then further disseminated by the user, has led 
to a general perception that increased copyright protection is necessary to provide 
works with adequate protection when transmitted in a digital form, and to provide 
sufficient incentive for new digital works to be created. As a consequence, current 
efforts at revising copyright laws have focused on ways by which protection of 
copyright works can be strengthened. This paper criticises the US approach to 
reforming the fair use doctrine, considering both the White Paper and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 1998. The market failure justification that the US 
approach favours ignores other more important justifications of fair use. Furthermore 
the White Paper's application of market failure to the Internet is severely flawed. This 
paper concludes that fair use has a fundamental role to play on the Internet, yet it is a 
role that is threatened by new technologies and proposed legislation. 
The paper is 1530 words in length ( excluding contents page and footnotes). 
I INTRODUCTION 
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But laws and institutions must go 
hand and hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, 
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We 
might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy .... 
1 
Thomas Jefferson 
Although Thomas Jefferson could not have foreseen the advent of the Internet 
revolution, his view that the law should not lag behind technology is a hotly debated 
topic today. Since copyright law was born following William Caxton's invention of 
the printing press
2 it has required merely minor alterations to its scope. With the 
advent of internet technology, as Thomas Jefferson might have said, the "coat" of 
copyright law has been stretched to breaking point. 
As copyright material becomes increasingly digitised, tensions have arisen between 
those controlling and using such material. Although digital technology provides 
significant benefits in disseminating copyright material, the fact that digitised material 
may be easily reproduced or manipulated, and then further disseminated by the user, 
1 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 13 (Sept. 1995) 
(quoting Inscription at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.). 
2 Paul Goldstein et al., Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines: Cases and the 
Materials on the Law of Intellectual Property 537 (3rd ed. 1993). 
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has led to a general perception in countries with strong copyright based industries
3 
that increased copyright protection is necessary to provide works with adequate 
protection when transmitted in a digital form, and to provide sufficient incentive for 
new digital works to be created.
4 As a consequence, current efforts at revising 
copyright laws have focused on ways by which protection of copyright works can be 
strengthened. 
Enhanced copyright protection may, however, come at a price to users of information. 
As the exclusive rights of the copyright owner become stronger, users' "rights" of free 
access and use of material in digital form may be diminished. Without such rights, 
there is a possibility of barriers being erected around information based products 
placing greater restrictions on the communication of ideas, with provision of material 
granted solely on the copyright owner's terms. 
This paper examines what role fair use will play on the Internet in the future. Fair 
use has always been an essential part of maintaining the copyright balance between 
copyright holders and users. In order to determine what is the appropriate role for 
the fair use doctrine on the Internet it is necessary to consider the rationale for it in 
relation to the copyright scheme in the print world and whether such justifications 
will still be relevant when applied to the Internet. 
3 For example, the United States of America, Germany and Australia. 
2 
II THE GOALS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
New Zealand's present system of copyright protection derives from English 
legislation in the 18th century. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this article to include a 
detailed summary of how and why English law developed a law of copyright,5 it is 
generally suggested that copyright protection was a reaction to laws that existed as 
tools of censorship, and thus was aimed at promoting the widespread dissemination of 
information. 
The first policy, and arguably the purpose of the copyright system, is the promotion 
of knowledge. The title of the Statute of Anne, the English copyright law created in 
1709 that forms the basis of the New Zealand Copyright Act 1994("The Act"), states 
that it is: "[a]n Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of 
Printed Books in the Authors of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned. 
116 
The second policy advanced by the Act is the idea of economically benefiting authors 
by granting them a temporary monopoly (an "exclusive right") in their writings. The 
limited monopoly right of copyright is the economic engine that drives the copyright 
system and fulfils its other policy goals. The Courts and legal commentators have 
perceived this monopoly as a necessary condition to fully realise the public interest in 
the operation and dissemination of such creative activities rather than solely as a 
4 See, for example Infonnation Infrastructure Task Force; 1995 and Copyright Convergence Group; 
1994. 
5 For an excellent summary see LR Patterson Copyright in Historical Perspective (Vanderbilt 
University Press, Nashville, 1968). 
6 8 Anne C. 21 (1709). 
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protection of the copyright holder's pecuniary interests.
7 The authorisation to grant 
individual authors limited monopoly rights is predicated on the resulting public 
benefit derived from the incentive to creative activities, and is a necessary condition 
to the full realisation of the productive activities of authors. 
The third policy promoted by the Act is ensuring public access. Under the Act, works 
are protected for only a "limited time. 
118 Access is still required during the limited 
period (i.e., the duration of the copyright) because the public needs the opportunity to 
gain knowledge from the uncopyrightable ideas included in the work. The creation of 
new works is dependent on use of existing material even during its copyright period. 
Otherwise, copyrighted material would not be accessible to authors of new works or 
to the public, and the first policy, the promotion of learning, would be frustrated. 
In order to further the primary goal of copyright, the promotion of the public body 
of knowledge, copyright increases the body of creative works by giving authors 
control over their works and thus providing incentives for them to produce.
9 The 
Act provides protection for several broad categories of works including literary, 
musical, dramatic, and audio works.
10 Any work falling into one of the delineated 
categories may be granted copyright protection, provided that the subject matter is 
7 See Sony Corp. of Am. V University City Studios, Line. , (1984) 464 US 417, 432 stating that the 
"immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labour. But the 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good. "; Feist 
publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. , (1991) 499 US 340, 349. See also Edward C. Walterscheid, 
"To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the United States Constitution" (1994) 3 J. Intel!. Prop. L. 1, 51. 
8 For the duration of copyright see Copyright Act 1994, s 22-25. 
9 Commentators have pointed out that there is an additional secondary benefit to owner control. By 
selling the works, authors and publishers gain valuable feedback about consumer preferences they can 
then use to make rational decisions about what to create in the future. See Goldstein, Copyright's 
Highway (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1994), at 178-79. 
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"recorded in writing or otherwise." 
11 
The author of a work enjoys exclusive rights in his property as granted by the Act. 
These rights consist of the right to copy the work, 
12 to issue copies of the work to the 
public13, to perform 14 , play15 or show 16 the work in public, to broadcast the work
17 
or to make an adaptation of the work.
18 Anyone who infringes any of the above 
rights will be held liable, and may be subject to both civil and criminal penalties.
19 
At the same time copyright law strives to maximize the public's access to those 
works to allow the public to benefit from the increased body of works. Much of the 
development of copyright law has centred on the attempt to resolve the tension 
between these two competing interests.
20 To keep the scope of the copyright 
monopoly reasonable, several principles have evolved to limit copyright protection 
where extending it would undermine the stated policy of benefiting the public. This 
tension is central to the definition of copyrightable subject matter,2
1 the 
idea/expression dichotomy, 
22 and it dictates the limited term of rights. 
23 However, 
1° Copyright Act 1994, s 14 (a)-(f) provides protection of original literary, dramatic, musical, or 
artistic works, sound recordings, films , broadcasts, cable programmes, typographical arrangements 
of published editions. 
11 Copyright Act 1994, s 15. 
12 Copyright Act 1994, s 16(a). 
13 Copyright Act 1994, s 16(b). 
14 Copyright Act 1994, s 16(c). 
15 Copyright Act 1994, s 16(d). 
16 Copyright Act 1994, s 16(e). 
17 Copyright Act 1994, s 16(f). 
18 Copyright Act 1994, s l 6(g). 
19 Copyright Act 1994, Part VI. 
20 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., "Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm", 49 Vand. L. 
Rev. 483 , 48."[D]efining copyright's proper scope has become a matter of balancing the benefits of 
broader protection, in the form of increased incentive to produce such works, against its costs, in the 
form oflost access to such works.") ; 
21 Copyright protection subsists only in original works of authorship, with recording needed for some 
works, Copyright Act 1994 s 14 -15 . Consequently, a content creator will receive protection only when 
the work is such that the public potentially can learn from, copy, and otherwise use that work. 
22 This refers to the distinction that copyright law makes between elements of a works that are ideas, 
and thus are in the public domain and can be copied, as opposed to the actual expression of those ideas 
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most importantly, the tension between creator control and public access provides 
much of the justification for the fair use doctrine. In this regard the function of the 
fair use doctrine coincides with the dual objectives of the copyright system. 
Ill THE DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE 
Even the very earliest of English copyright cases following the enactment of the 
Statute of Anne recognised that there may be acceptable non-licensed uses of 
copyright material that do not infringe copyright. It was clearly recognised that 
copyright in a work did not prevent anyone else from using the work; the right was 
simply to prevent the work's reproduction. In Miller v Donaldson, Aston J stated 
that a purchaser of a book may "improve upon it, imitate it, translate it, oppose its 
sentiments: but he buys no right to publish the identical work.
24 More specifically, 
English courts began to allow what became known as "fair abridgement", and a right 
allowing the illustration of a review with quotations.
25 This exception evolved into 
the current concept of fair use. 
The current fair use doctrine is a privilege that allows someone other than the 
copyright owner to use copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the 
by an author, which copyright protects. For example, one could copy Einstein's theory ofrelativity, 
but could not copy his expression of the theory. 
23 See Copyright Act 1994, ss 22-25. The Copyright Act provides that the term of . 
copyright should be limited. the term of copyright protection is limited to the life of the 
author plus 50 years . In the case of works for hire, anonymous, or pseudonymous works, the 
term is 75 years from first publication or 100 years from creation, whichever is shorter. After 
the term expires, the public has full access to use and copy these works freely. The term is 
meant to be long enough to induce creation, while short enough not to hinder unduly public 
access. 
24 98 ER 201 , per Aston J at 226; see also Lord Mansfield at 251 
25 For example, see Mawman v. Tegg 2 Russell 383, per Lord Eldon. 
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owner's prior consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner. Fair use 
is an affirmative defence that comes into play only after the plaintiff has proven a 
prima facie case of infringement. 
In New Zealand a "fair use" must fit within one of the categories set out in Part III of 
the Act. The main26 categories are "criticism, review, and news reporting"27 and 
"research and private study."28 These categories limit the scope of the defence, 
protecting the interests of creators,29 and serve to distinguish the New Zealand 
defence from its equivalent within the United States copyright legislation, where fair 
use is not restricted by categorisation. 30 
In determining whether a use fitting under one of the categories is "fair", the courts 
conduct a balancing process in which a number of variables determine whether other 
interests outweigh the rights of copyright owners. The court evaluates and balances 
the social benefit that the public derives from the unauthorized use in light of the 
interest in protecting the copyright owner's exclusive control of the work. A dealing 
with a work for the purpose of research or private study is assessed for fairness by 
reference to the factors set out in section 43(3). These factors are very similar to 
26 What about exam/library fair use etc? 
27 Copyright Act 1994, s 42. 
28 Copyright Act 1994, s 43 . 
29 Fulton G "Fair Dealing in the Digital Age", Australian Copy right Council Bulletin 92 (Sydney, 
1996)45. 
30 Whilst it may be thought that the different constitutional context in which decisions of US courts are 
made would cause those decisions to have less relevance to Australian law, it is nevertheless true that 
US and Australian copyright law share many of the same judicial antecedents and, as a consequence, 
decisions of US Courts require consideration. A New Zealand court, if faced with a question of fair use 
in relation to a literary work, would therefore need to refer to relevant decisions of the courts of the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United States. 
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those that are applied in the US to judge fair use. Five statutory factors must be 
considered by the Court, narnely: 31 
(a) The purpose of the copying; and 
(b) The nature of the work copied; and 
(c) Whether the work could have been obtained within a reasonable time at an 
ordinary commercial price; and 
( d) The effect of the copying on the potential market for, or value of, the work; 
and 
(e) Where part of a work is copied, the amount and substantiality of the part 
copied, the amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the whole 
work. 
The precise scope of the doctrine of fair use is unclear. In his well-known description 
of fair use, 32 Lord Denning once stated, "(I)t is impossible to define what is "fair 
use". It must be a question of degree". 33 The drafting of the New Zealand fair use 
provisions, like those in other jurisdictions, has been left broad, with little legislative 
guidance as to what is to be considered with respect to determining the "fairness" of a 
use. The breadth of the fair use provisions provides the courts with a wide discretion 
to shape the law in this area according to the varying factual situations of each 
31 Copyright Act 1994, s 43(3) (a)-(e). 
32 Describing section 6 of the Copyright Act 1956 (UK) " fair use for criticism or review". 
33 Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 at 94. 
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specific case. For example, in University of New South Wales v Moorhouse, Chief 
Justice Gibbs said: 34 
The principles laid down by the Act are broadly stated, by reference to such abstract concepts as "fair 
use" , and it is left to the courts to apply those principles after a detailed consideration of all the 
circumstances of a particular case. 
Such a wide discretion in the law does, however, have the disadvantage of reducing 
certainty for the application of the law by copyright users. Such uncertainty was at 
least partly the reason why the Franki Committee recommended the introduction of 
the factors now set out in section 43(3). 35 For reasons that were not explained, these 
factors have only been enacted in the provision dealing with fair use for the purposes 
ofresearch and study. 36 For the remaining categories of fair dealing with works, that 
is, a fair dealing for criticism and review or newsreporting37 there is no such 
legislative guidance, and any assistance as to the circumstances when a dealing with 
a work for those purposes will be "fair" must be gleaned from the common law. 
IV THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNET ON THE DOCTRINE OF FAIR 
USE 
The technical foundation of the Internet is not important for the purposes of this 
paper. Instead, it is the way in which the Internet is used, or can be used, that is 
34 (1975) 133 CLR 1, per Gibbs CJ at 12. 
35 C. Benson "Fair Dealing in the United Kingdom", 6 EIPR 522, 530. 
36 These are found in section 43 of the Act. 
37 These are found in section 42 of the Act. 
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relevant. 38 The Internet represents a major challenge to copyright law and the 
doctrine of fair use for a number of reasons. 
A Ease of Duplication 
The first is the ease and convenience by which material on the Internet can be 
duplicated. While the camera, photocopier, and videocassette recorder have all 
impacted copyright law over the last hundred years, no other medium allows for 
duplication and distribution of nearly any kind of copyrighted material. 
Some copyright holders argue that the Internet impairs their copyright interests by 
fundamentally transforming the nature and means of publication and thus making 
their works extremely vulnerable to Internet piracy. The decentralized nature of the 
Internet's management makes it possible for any user to widely disseminate a work on 
the electronic network through any number of channels. Before the advent of digital 
technology, an average consumer was limited in her ability to widely distribute 
quality copies of copyrighted works. Since most copyright owners are publishers, 
these large businesses had little economic incentive to enforce infringement claims 
against individual users because of the technological limitations on the quality that 
they could and would desire to make. The Internet does not possess a centralized 
control mechanism. Thus, the copyright holder's interest in protecting his or her 
limited monopoly is jeopardized by this new technology. 
This has prompted changes in the behaviour of copyright holders. While some have 
38 For an overview of the development of the Internet, see Robert H. Zak.on, Hobbes' Internet Timeline 
v4. l (last visited 23 July, 2000) <http:// info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/History/HIT.html>. 
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gone to great lengths to protect copyrighted materials from the Internet, 
39 others have 
realized the futility in controlling private use and have relinquished distribution 
control in the hope that users will avoid commercial activity.
40 
B Technological Developments in Response to Internet Piracy 
1 Prevention of access to online material 
As a response to the increased threat of piracy the Internet brings, many copyright 
holders have resorted to technological means to restrict access to online material. 
Holders can protect their works through a variety of methods, including encryption 
programmes to prevent copying, and limiting access to data through the use of 
passwords.41 Further, computer hardware can be programmed to read encrypted bits, 
which would permit copying only where an authorised user has access to a particular 
code or decryption "key".42 Incorporation of encryption technology within 
copyrighted works disseminated over the Internet would allow the copyright holder to 
limit the number of times his or her work could be retrieved, opened, printed or 
copied. These methods would in turn limit the ability of users to violate copyright 
holders' exclusive rights. 
39 See Richard Morrison, The Rights that Don't Smell Quite Right, The London Times, Oct. 23 , 1998, 
at 41 (suggesting that the recent extension of copyright protection in the United States for movies 
before they enter the public domain may have been motivated by what was to have been the expiration 
in 2003 of the cartoon Steamboat Willie, where Mickey Mouse made his first appearance) . 
40 See Associated Press, Grateful Dead to Allow MP3 Trades (visited May 13, 2000) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/style/features/daily/dead05 l 3.htm>. 
41 For example, at www.economist.com , where access to the current Economist publication is limited 
to those who have an online subscription, who are provided with a password. 
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2 Ease of licensing 
New technological developments enable large scale licensing of material on the 
Internet. Just as publishers in the print world have already worked out a system to 
license uses of technical articles, the Internet conceivably allows all copyright owners 
to license all digitally available content.43 It is possible to encode each bit of content 
with the information required to ensure payment to the appropriate content owner. 
One method of doing so is automated rights management ("ARM").
44 The user need 
not do any research at all in order to determine the identity of the owner. Rather, the 
user merely needs to click on a box to agree to pay a given amount. Furthermore, 
various organizations and entrepreneurs are developing increasingly efficient payment 
structures for increasingly minor transactions.45 In the typical situation, each user 
would have her own account with a service provider. She would pay into that account, 
and each time she purchased content or access time to some web site, the system 
would automatically debit her account for a certain amount and credit that amount to 
the owner. 46 
42 John Sampson, Electronic Signatures: facilitating secure electronic commerce, Victoria University 
Wellington LLB(Hons) research essay. 
43 See Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1994), at 224 
(examining the likely manifestation of this market) . 
44 This Article favours "automated rights management" as the most exact label for the processes at 
issue. Terminology in this new field remains in flux , however. Alternative terms include "trusted 
systems," see Mark Stefik, "Trusted Systems", SCI. AM. , Mar. 1997, 78 , 80 available at 
<http: //www.sciam.com/0397issue/0397stefik.html> (visited May. 5, 2000); Julie E. Cohen, "A Right 
to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace", (1996) 28 Conn. 
L. Rev. 981 ; "rights management,"see Mary Grace Smith & Robert Weber, "A New Set of Rules for 
Information Commerce-Rights-Protection Technologies and Personalized-Information Commerce Will 
Affect All Knowledge Workers", Comm. Wk., Nov. 6, 1995, 34, 34; and "telerights," see Wade 
Riddick, "From Copyright to Telerights", BYTE, Feb. 1996, 248, 248. 
45 See, e.g., Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, "The Buck Starts Here", Wired, Aug. 1996, 132 (discussing 
various plans for digital money systems and the hurdles those plans face) . 
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Technologies such as ARM threaten to radically reduce the scope of the fair use 
defence to copyright infringement.
47 It has been argued that ARM will interact with 
existing legal doctrines to supplant/air use
48 with an analogous but distinctly different 
doctrine: fared use. 
49 The advent of such technology, combined with recent American 
decisions, may suggest that fair use is unlikely to be available as a defence where a 
licensing scheme exists for use of the material and where the alleged fair use 
interferes with the copyright owners ' potential or actual market.
50 The existence of 
fair use is further threatened if technological restraints on access to material mean that 
copyright owners can, in practice, prevent any access to copyright material without 
payment. 
V THE FUTURE OF FAIR USE ON THE INTERNET 
46 This is already common practice for many web sites at present. For example: see 
www.westlaw.com; www.lexis.com; www.newscientist.com. (Last visited 10 September 2000.) 
47 ARM encompasses a variety of technologies, including: encryption, firewalls , and passwords to limit 
access to information; digital watermarks and stegonography to identify electronic documents; and 
micropayments and embedded applications to ensure that users pay for protected information. See Julie 
E. Cohen, "A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in 
Cyberspace", (1996) 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 , 982 . 
48 See David Post, "Battle or Dance?" AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1996, 116, 117 (observing that due to 
automated rights management, " 'transaction costs'-of negotiating a license fee for each use of a 
copyrighted work, however trivial and insignificant-are rapidly disappearing," and raising the question: 
"Once tracking and payment mechanisms of this kind are in place, is there still a place for fair use?"); 
David G. Post, "Controlling Cybercopies; Leaping Before Looking; Proposals Would Make Unsettling 
Changes", Legal Times-Special Report; Intel!. Prop., Apr. 8, 1996, 39, 45 ("[A]lthough one may retain 
the theoretical legal right to make fair use of material, where rights holders are permitted to use 
powerful technological means to control access to their works, fair use may prove illusory.") 
49 Very broadly speaking, fared use would require consumers to pay for the right to access and reuse 
information, rather than appealing to a statutory fair use exception. See Julie E. Cohen, "A Right to 
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace", (1996) 28 Conn. L. 
Rev. 981, 983. 
so Mary Grace Smith & Robert Weber, "A New Set of Rules for Information Commerce-Rights-
Protection Technologies and Personalized-Information Commerce Will Affect All Knowledge 
Workers", Comm. Wk., Nov. 6, 1995 , 34, 37. 
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Given the globalisation of copyright law, the critical factor in determining the future 
of fair use on the Internet in New Zealand copyright law will be the way in which 
New Zealand's trading partners view exceptions to the rights of copyright holders.5' 
With this in mind, this paper examines the approach of the United States of America 
to the issue of fair use and the Internet. It is likely that the United States approach 
will be the most influential worldwide. 
52 Furthermore, the issue has been more fully 
debated in the United States than anywhere else at the present time. The debate in the 
United States has centred on the findings of the Information Infrastructure Task Force 
of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. The findings of the Task Force 
appear in the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, also 
known as the "White Paper".53 The White Paper represents the most comprehensive 
discussion of the role of fair use on the Internet. Some of its recommendations have 
already been given statutory recognition in the provisions of the National Information 
Infrastructure Copyright Bill 1995 (NII Bill), 
54 as well as the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 1998, ("DMCA"). The findings of the White Paper are likely to 
remain influential in the approach of the US legislature to this issue. This part outlines 
the findings of the White Paper and the provisions of the DMCA relating to fair use. 
The following part examines the validity of the White Paper's reasoning and the 
provisions of the DMCA. 
51 Due to the extension of multilateral trade agreements to intellectual property, New Zealand is part of 
a global economy that will become increasingly centred around intellectual property as the information 
economy comes of age. New Zealand will be under a large amount of pressure to conform to 
international standards. It is likely that differing exceptions to copyright will not be tolerated by 
countries with strong intellectual property based economies. New Zealand's intellectual property laws 
are designed to conform with principles established by international conventions and treaties. For 
example, New Zealand is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. If overseas countries restrict the exceptions to copyright protection in response to 
digital technologies, New Zealand will be likely to follow suit. 
52 See Liu P, "US Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special Actions", 
(13) Pacific Basin Law Journal, 87, 87-116. 
53 The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (1995) can be found at 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/corn/doc/ipnii {last visited May 27, 2000}. 
14 
VI THE US APPROACH 
A The White Paper 
The White Paper predicts that the Internet will lead to the demise of the fair use 
doctrine. It posits that licensing will be easier in the digital world, as users of 
copyrighted work can communicate with, and obtain permission from, the 
copyright owner cheaply and simply. It then makes a connection between easier 
licensing arrangements and a more limited scope of the fair use doctrine. According 
to its reasoning, fair use will be replaced by licensing. 
55 The White Paper assumes 
that licensing will better maintain the balance between copyright holders and users 
and foster the goals of copyright law. 
56 
The conclusion that fair use will have no place on the Internet is based on a number 
of key premises. First, it is based on the assumption that fair use only exists to 
correct situations where a use cannot be licensed, and market failure results. It has 
been stated that "the White Paper attempts to eliminate fair use rights by interpreting 
existing law as though fair use has no application when a use can be licensed .... ". 
57 
Its reasoning is based on the market failure justification of fair use, ignoring other 
rationales for the doctrine. The second assumption is that the Internet will eliminate 
market failure by providing perfect licensing markets. The next part examines the 
validity of the White Paper's reasoning and concludes that it is flawed. 
54 "The NII Copyright Bill of 1995", Senate Bill 104 S. 1284. 
55 White Paper, 83 . (The Task Force commented that "technological means of tracking transactions 
and licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine.") 
56 White Paper, 113. 
57 Pamela Samuelson, "The Copyright Grab", Wired, Jan. 1996, 134, 134. 
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B The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 
The DMCA is the most recent US legislation which aims to modify copyright law in 
the face of new technologies. 
58 It implements two treaties from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization ("WIPO"). 
59 The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty require signatory countries to grant foreign 
copyrighted materials at least the same protections as domestic copyrighted materials . 
The DMCA promotes the main object of the White Paper, namely, to replace fair use 
on the Internet with a licensing system. It protects the ability of copyright holders to 
license their work by making illegal technologies which are designed to circumvent 
technological means employed to prevent unlicensed access to copyright work on the 
Internet. 60 The effect of the DMCA is analysed later in this paper. 
VII IS THE US APPROACH APPROPRIATE? 
A The White Paper 
The premises on which the White Paper is based are incorrect for a number of 
reasons. There are many faults with the market failure justification for fair use in the 
58 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) 
(codified at 17 U.S .C. § 1201); see also The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. 
Copyright Office Summary (visited May 12, 1999) 
<http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/legislation/dmca.pdf>. (Last visited 2 July 2000.) 
59 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201). 
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print world. Furthermore, the White Paper's reasoning that emerging digital 
licensing systems will eliminate market failure on the Internet, is wrong. Lastly, and 
perhaps most fundamentally of all , the market failure view of fair use is not the only, 
or indeed the proper justification for the fair use doctrine. As the later part of this 
paper will demonstrate, other justifications for fair use, when applied to the Internet, 
emphasise that there is as great a need for the defence as ever before. 
B The Market Failure Justification of Fair Use 
The White Paper's analysis is based on a trend in recent years which seeks to interpret 
courts' decisions as being based on an economic, or market failure rationale of fair 
use. 61 Particularly relevant is the response of the market failure justification of fair 
use to the emergence of new licensing markets. Under the market failure approach, 
any copyright owner who can demonstrate that they have suffered, or is likely to 
suffer, a loss of licensing revenues as a result of a failure by a user of copyright 
material to obtain a copying licence will have a strong case for rebutting the defence 
of fair dealing. This is explained in greater detail below. 
a) Copyright laws enable a private market 
60 17 U.S.C. § 120 l (a) (Supp. 1999). This section does not become effective for two years, while 
administrative rules are being written. 
61 This type of analysis started with an influential article by Wendy Gordon: see Wendy J Gordon "Fair 
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betarnax Case and Its Predecessors" 
(1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1600. 
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Expressive content, as a type of information, is a public good. 
62 According to the 
economic model of public goods, absent an intellectual property system, market 
participants will under-produce expressive works.
63 For instance, if we did not give 
any copyright protection, publishers might well wait for someone else to publish a 
successful work. They could then reprint it themselves and save the costs of paying 
any royalties for the use of the work. Likewise, consumers could simply make their 
own copies, thereby paying only the cost of the physical reproduction. In such a 
system, authors would never receive payment adequate to underwrite their work, and 
society's creative output would suffer.
64 In order to maximize production of creative 
content, therefore, copyright laws aim to remove expressive works from the realm of 
public goods.65 
The copyright system counteracts the public nature of the goods by allowing a 
copyright owner to exclude non-paying individuals from the benefits. The copyright 
system gives content creators control over their works specifically to create a 
workable market between the content creator and potential users.
66 As a result, the 
copyright-exchange mechanisms function similarly to those in other markets.
67 
62 Robert Cooter & Thomas U1en, Law and Economics, (Harper Collins, Glenview, Illinois, 1988) 56. 
63 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, (Harper Collins, Glenview, Illinois, 1988) 
40 ("economically rational firms will not produce the optimal amount of public goods in an 
unregulated market") . 
64 Of course, there are other systems in place in our society that would ensure some creation. 
For instance, the tenure system at most universities forces academics to produce and 
provides them with reward for that production. Although such systems will ensure creation 
of certain types of works, most creation would go without reward. 
65 Theoretically, another solution would be to finance creation publicly, that is, the government could 
produce these works. In fact, our government provides many public goods, such as national defence, 
scientific research, and weather satellites. But, for obvious reasons, we have chosen a different path for 
creative works. 
66 There is some reason to believe that the digital market itself now allows owners to control 
the non-excludability element of public goods. This evolving market now grants copyright 
owners substantial new powers to control dissemination of their own works. Eric Schlachter 
has described numerous ways in which content owners can control their works without 
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The economic justification for copyright law argues that the extent of copyright 
protection should be limited only to what is necessary to provide sufficient incentive 
to create works not otherwise provided by the unregulated market. This economic 
analysis of the copyright market rests on the fundamental premise that the purpose of 
copyright law is to create a workable exchange system between creators and users. 
Anything that goes beyond the incentive to encourage the creation of new works is 
likely to create a market inefficiency because of the strength of the monopoly 
enjoyed by the creator. This dilemma is explained by Cooter and Ulen: 
68 
Put succinctly, the dilemma is that without a legal monopoly not enough information will be 
produced but with the legal monopoly too little of the information will be used. 
Thus, too much copyright protection has the potential to impede creativity or 
commercial investment in the new development of material. For example, the 
relying on copyright law. See Eric Schlachter, "The Intellectual Property Renaissance in 
Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet", (1996) 12 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 15 , 38-49. (Arguing that copyright laws may be unnecessary because 
content owners will take advantage of certain aspects of the new medium to protect their 
works through technological, rather than legal, means); see also Mark Stefik, " Shifting the 
Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital 
Publishing", (1997) 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 137, 138. ("With the development of trusted 
system technology and usage rights languages with which to encode the rights associated 
with copyrighted material, authors and publishers can have more, not less, control over their 
work.") With the content owners' new-found controls, some might argue that the goods are 
no longer public at all. To present the particular problems that disturb a market, goods must 
have both of the elements discussed above: non-rivalrous consumption and non-
excludability. Without the public goods problem, perhaps there is no need for fair use or for 
copyright law at all. In fact, a similar line of reasoning has led some commentators to just 
such a conclusion: Because copyright law and digital technology each perform the same 
function, there is no need for copyright law in this environment. See Schlachter, supra, 49. 
However, there is an inherent benefit to public goods. The fact that they are non-rivalrous is 
a tremendous source of value. We should inquire, then, if there is a similar check on digital 
technology that allows us to retain some of the benefits of public goods. Eventually, 
technology may allow users to ignore content owners' controls and thus copy without 
paying. Theoretically, such circumvention provides a way for users to render a type of use 
public. Without fair use or other circumvention capability, we lose the ability to make the 
minor adjustments that temper the content-owner's monopoly power and that preserve the 
benefits of public goods. 
67 For further economic insights on the copyright marketplace, see, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, Law and 
Economics (Harper Collins, Glenview, Illinois, 1988), 125-28; William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright," (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325. 
68 Cooter Rand Ulen T Law and Economics (Harper Collins, Glenview, Illinois, 1988) 135 . 
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producers of multimedia works often seek to incorporate elements of existing works 
in an original setting.69 Increasing copyright protection, or reducing limitations on the 
owner's rights, could be detrimental to the interests of creators such as multimedia 
artists by preventing such uses of existing works. Thus, any expansion of the rights of 
the author as a creator wi 11 also hinder the creative scope of the author as a user. 
70 
The analysis of economists Landes and Posner supports this notion.
71 They argue that 
"the less extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer or other 
creator can borrow from previous works without infringing copyright and the lower, 
therefore, the costs of creating a new work." 72 The converse, they argue, is also true -
the more extensive copyright protection becomes, the higher the costs become of 
creating a new work, which may in fact work against the incentive ideal. Extensive 
protection may also lead to the lack of an efficient industry standard where such a 
standard would be in the public interest. 
Fair use enters into this economic analysis of copyright when, due to imperfect 
conditions in the copyright market, the costs of creating a new work are too high as a 
result of copyright protection, which stops a new user from using the copyrighted 
material. This is the market-failure justification of fair use.
73 The market-failure 
explanation provides a strong justification for courts to grant free use to certain types 
69 For example Postmodem artists, such as Jeff Koons, often create art by taking everyday objects and 
placing them in a museum setting, often without permission of the copyright holder. 
70 W. Van Caenegem, "Communications Issues in Copyright Reform", (1995), 13 Australian Copyright 
Reporter No 3, 72, 81. 
7 1 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright," (1989) 18 J. 
Legal Stud. 325. 
72 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright," (1989) 18 J. Legal 
Stud. 325, 325, 328. 
73 See Wendy J. Gordon, "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors", 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982). In this article, Professor Gordon 
first applied a market failure analysis to the fair use doctrine. 
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b) 
of copies in the print world. The argument identifies that fair use is a necessary 
response to the various costs that prevent the copyright marketplace from 
functioning in a proper way. An example of the copyright market not functioning in 
a flawless manner is the example of the use of small amounts of text from 
copyrighted works. For the average user who wishes to quote from a passage in a 
book, a market for such small portions of information has never developed because 
owners have never come up with an efficient way in which to license copies to users . 
The fair use of such material can be justified as a remedy for this failed market. 
Fair Use Corrects Imperfections in the Copyright Market 
If the market between a copyright-holder and a user is perfect, the two parties will be 
able to come to an agreement on a price and enter into a contract to allow the use of 
the material. 74 In such a case, economic insight suggests that the policy aims of 
copyright are not threatened:
75 the owner receives a reward for creation, and the user 
will be able to use the materials in new and potentially productive ways. 
76 Having 
74 Substantial complications arise in even a simplistic application of this model to the copyright world, 
in part because of the presence of the public goods problem. Not only is the original content naturally a 
fublic good, but many types of secondary uses have the public goods characteristics as well. 
5 Outside interference in a perfectly functioning market generally cannot help to obtain a more 
efficient allocation ofresources. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, "An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright," (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 . 
76 Note that this claim oversimplifies the issue. If we allowed the user free use of the material, the user 
would have more resources to spend on other activities, including perhaps the acquisition and 
distribution of other pieces of intellectual property. Although all transfers that promote efficiency 
would occur in a perfect market, we may want to distribute wealth in other cases as well. Accordingly, 
a potential function of fair use is to encourage transfer even when not efficiency-enhancing, for purely 
distributional reasons. See Robert P. Merges, "The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in 
the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce", (1997) 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 131, 133-34. 
Professor Gordon notes that "(t]here may also be occasions in which it is normatively inappropriate to 
use even a perfectly functioning market." Wendy J Gordon "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors" (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 
1607. For instance, "[i]fthe defendant's interest impinges on a first amendment interest, relying upon 
the market may become particularly inappropriate; constitutional values are rarely well paid in the 
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allowed owners to close out free-riders, the copyright system does not need to take 
any further steps. However, in certain circumstances, imperfections in the market 
interfere with efficient outcomes. When substantial transaction costs 
77 or other 
imperfections are present in a given market, the market will not necessarily produce 
the most efficient outcome. In such cases, some sort of outside interference, 
(legislative or otherwise) may help to ensure a more beneficial result. 
78 
In the copyright market, analysts have identified many sources of imperfection. 
These commentators have focused primarily on the tracing and bargaining costs that 
pervade this marketplace. Tracing costs 79 occur because the copyright owner is 
rarely present when the subsequent user decides to copy the work. The identity of the 
owner often will not be obvious from viewing the copyrighted work, and the owner 
will rarely be easy to reach. Bargaining costs refer to the expense of negotiating with 
the distant party who owns the copyright in the work. In the absence of a fully 
functioning and efficient sub-market in the type of content sought to be used, it is 
likely that such costs may exceed the benefits the transfer of material would otherwise 
create. 80 If so, the transfer will not occur. As a result, the goal of furthering learning 
is not advanced at all. 
The fair use doctrine can be seen as an attempt to respond to such failures in the 
marketplace and, while the citizenry would no doubt be willing to pay to avoid losing such values, it is 
awkward at best to try to put a 'price' on them." Id. 1631 . 
77 Because various people use the term transaction costs in slightly different ways, the particular type of 
cost or failure that is evident in a given instance will be referred to. 
78 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral", (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1111. The authors carry the idea so far as 
to say that in certain circumstances, the most economically efficient solution may be to forbid 
bargaining altogether. 
79 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright," (1989) 18 J. 
Legal Stud. 325, 346 (identifying tracing costs as consisting of determining exactly who owns the 
copyright and tracking down that person, and concluding that these costs explain certain limitations on 
the copyright, such as the limited term of years) . 
80 See, e.g. , Gordon, supra note 9, at 1608. 
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copyright market. 81 In general, the market will yield the result copyright policy 
dictates. However, in situations in which imperfections lead to market failure, and as 
a result, the goal of payment to the content owner is unattainable, fair use provides a 
correction to the market that preserves at least some of the overall copyright goals. 
82 
This concept has been explained along the grounds of some benefit is better than 
none: 83 
Fair use operates on the pragmatic notion that half a loaf is better than none: without it, the copyright 
owner would get no revenues because costs of negotiating a license are insuperably high, while the 
prospective user would for the same reason get no copy; with it, the copyright owner still gets nothing, 
but the user at least gets to make a copy. 
To use the example of a person writing an essay for an English course and wishing to 
quote a small passage from Hunter S. Thompson's book Fear and Loathing in Las 
Vegas, the transaction costs in gaining the permission of the copyright owner could 
be likely to involve considerable costs. The identity and location of the copyright 
holder would have to be determined, which could involve a significant amounts of 
81 See Gordon, Wendy J Gordon "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors" (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1605. Although Gordon first 
expounded this market-failure paradigm in 1982, the market function has long been central to the fair 
use analysis . From the earliest fair-use cases, courts have looked to the effect of potential infringements 
on the relevant markets. When he first introduced the concept of fair use into the copyright doctrine, 
Justice Story directed courts to look to the "degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish 
the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." Folsom v Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901 ). The greater the likelihood of such adverse economic effect, the less likely a 
court should be to find a use fair. 
82 Professor Gordon posited that there are three concerns to weigh before finding fair use: first, author 
incentives; second, user access; and third, whether the defendant can "appropriately purchase the 
desired use through the market." Wendy J Gordon "Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors" (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1605 . 
("[F]air use should be interpreted as a mode of judicial response to market failure in the copyright 
context, and ... the presence or absence of the indicia of market failure provides a previously missing 
rationale for predicting the outcome of fair use cases."). 
83 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1994), at 170. Note that 
this solution corresponds to the most basic notion of achieving equal to efficiency. A solution is equal 
efficient if it makes one party better off without making any other parties worse off. 
23 
time and money. Also, gaining permission from the copyright holder would involve 
additional costs, such as long distance telephone calls. The parties would then have to 
bargain with each other in order to determine a price for the use of the quote. 
In the context of fragmented copying, as in the above example, the courts have 
tended to favour the user's rights over the copyright owner's rights. Whether they 
find a particular use de minimis, 84 fair use, 85 or both, 86courts have generally allowed 
users to make fragmented copies of print content without paying the owner. 
However, the courts' opinion may change when arrangements exist, or come into 
existence which facilitate gaining a license to copy. 
c) The Effect of Emerging Markets on the Scope of Fair Use under the Market Failure 
Paradigm 
84 See, e.g., Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass 'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451, 464 (S.D.N. Y. 1981) (finding the 
copying of two separate lines from an article "to be so fragmented as to be de minimis"); see also 
White Paper, at 65 ("When copying is ... of such a small amount as to be de minimis, then there is no 
infringement liability."). The reader should note that courts will sometimes use de minimis to describe 
a slightly different situation. Instead of taking only a de minimis amount of expression, the user may 
take a substantial amount, yet the particular infringement is so insignificant as to cause no noticeable 
injury. See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (1997) § 8.0 l[G]. For instance, a court might 
find that the copy made of a work when a user's computer displays it on the monitor is so transitory as 
to be de minimis. 
85 See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741,744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding copying of 
four notes out of l 00 bars of music to be fair use); see generally Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
(1997) § 8.0l[G]. 
86 See, e.g., Toulmin v. Rike-Kulmer Co., ("The use of one sentence and part of another 
[took] neither a substantial nor material part of the [original work], did not in any degree 
prejudice the sale, diminish the profits or supersede the objects of the original work, and was 
thus a 'fair use' thereof .... [T]his is a clear case of de minimis. ") One commentator finds the 
courts' mixed terminology to be unfortunate. Nimmer argues that "the meaning of 'fair use' is 
thereby rendered confusingly ambiguous." See also Linda J.," Of Bread and Roses and 
Copyrights", 1989 Duke L.J. 1532, 1545 ("The idea that a de minimis copying may 
constitute fair use has existed for decades and was apparently endorsed by Justice Blackmun 
in the Betamax case .... Blackmun gave examples of situations in which de minimis copying 
was appropriate, such as photocopying newspaper clippings or pinning quotations on a 
bulletin board." 
24 
To the extent that courts rest their rationale for fair use on tracing and bargaining 
costs, they may be less likely to grant fair use when a particular copyright market 
develops that more closely resembles these other types of markets. 
87 A number of 
recent decisions have been perceived as using the emergence of a newly developed 
licensing market to drastically limit the scope of fair use protection. 
88 
i) The Texaco case 
The dispute in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco lnc
89 ("Texaco") focused on 
the practices of Texaco's in-house researchers. Texaco maintained a library that 
subscribed to various scientific and technical journals. The library circulated the 
journals among its 400 to 500 researchers. When researchers found that a particular 
article would be of use in their work, they would copy the article or ask another 
Texaco employee to copy that article. 90 
The Court acknowledged that Texaco had a valid market-failure rationale for this 
practice in the past. Previously, there had never been "a simple or efficient means to 
obtain single copies of individual articles. "
91 Publishers had traditionally released 
87 New forms of technology will often reduce the costs that interfere in given markets. Of 
course, these new technologies are generally designed to achieve just some such effect. 
Examples include moveable-type printing presses, video cassette recorders, digital audio 
tapes, fax machines, and so on. In one of the more dramatic examples, the photocopier has 
worked a huge change in the landscape for copyright owners and users. With the advent of 
this new machine, users could suddenly make copies at a small fraction of the cost they 
would have expended previously (such as the time it might take to write out a new copy by 
hand). The advent of the photocopier did not address per se the tracing or bargaining costs 
inherent in the market, that is, it did not directly allow users to track down owners and 
bargain with them. Nonetheless, an institution, the Copyright Clearance Centre, eventually 
(and predictably) arose to take advantage of the new efficiency the photocopier created. 
88 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997); 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994). 
89 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
90 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), 915 . 
91 Above n.90, 927. 
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individual articles only in the format of a complete journal volume. Consequently, 
Texaco argued, its practice of copying individual articles did not affect any judicially 
recognisable market. The court agreed that 11 [ o ]nly an impact on potential licensing 
revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets should be 
legally recognisable when evaluating a secondary use . 1192 Further, the court agreed 
that 11a particular unauthorized use should be considered 'more fair' when there is no 
ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be 
considered 'less fair' when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use. 
1193 
Nonetheless, the court decided against Texaco. The Court emphasised the ability of 
Texaco to obtain a licence for its copying of journal articles, rather than copying 
them for free. Thus, the Court held that a use will be considered less fair when there is 
a ready market or means to pay for the use. 94 The court's reasoning turned on the new 
market presence of the Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC"). 
95 The court concluded 
that the publishers involved in the formation of the CCC had created "a workable 
market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own 
copies of individual articles via photocopying. "
96 In other words, the publishers had 
set up a market in which the transaction costs of paying for the given use were 
minimal.97 On the strength of this observation, the court found that Texaco had no 
valid fair-use defence, even though the scientists were engaged in research.
98 
92 Above n.90, 930. 
93 Above n.90, 931. 
94 .29 IPR 38, 406. 
95 See American Geophysical American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 929 n.16; see Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright's Highway (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1994), 219-23 (discussing the 
Copyright Clearance Centre's creation and rise in influence). 
96 60 F. 3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), 930. 
97 The Copyright Clearance Centre ("CCC") facilitates licensing of individual articles from various 
copyright holders. An organization might get a blanket license from the CCC to copy articles the CCC 
controls, or it might pay fees for the copies on a per-copy basis. The CCC aims to distribute the 
proceeds fairly among the various authors it represents. Users can make copies themselves and pay for 
them much more cheaply and quickly than if they called the owner and ordered a new copy of the 
work. By paying the CCC a reasonable royalty for the right to copy, the user divides the new-found 
26 
ii) The Princeton case 
Princeton Univ. Press v Michigan Document Service, Inc. ("Princeton") 
99 concerned 
a copy shop that served the academic community at the University of Michigan. The 
copy shop prepared course packs for various classes. The owner of the shop refused to 
request permission from, or to pay licensing fees to, the textbook publishing 
companies from which he copied the materials for the course packs. At first instance, 
the Court in deciding in favour of the defendant's copying activities, said that:
100 
Evidence of lost permission fees does not bear on market effect. The right to permission fees is 
precisely what is at issue here. It is circular to argue that a use in unfair, and a fee therefore required, 
on the basis that the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee. 
However, the Court's decision was overturned by a majority of the same Court 
following the Appeal Court's decision to hear the case en bane. Similar reasoning 
to that of the court in Texaco was adopted in the second hearing by the Sixth Circuit 
in Princeton. The Sixth Circuit held that the commercial preparation of course notes 
did not merit a fair use, even though the ultimate purpose of the copying was 
education. The court in Princeton focused on factual issues that showed that tracing 
costs were minimal. The court noted that the three plaintiff publishing companies 
each had a department that processed requests from these copy shops. Furthermore, 
the copy shop could have licensed the use through the CCC. "Where ... the 
copyright holder clearly does have an interest in exploiting a licensing market. .. and 
especially where the copyright holder has actually succeeded in doing so, it is 
surplus with the copyright owner. Of course, the CCC's royalty system also reduces drastically the 
tracing and bargaining costs for this particular market. 
98 60 F. 3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), 931-32 . 
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appropriate that potential licensing revenues for photocopying be considered in a fair 
use analysis." 101 In this instance, the three plaintiffs together earned a substantial 
amount in copy shop permission fees. The court concluded that "the destruction of 
this revenue stream can only have a deleterious effect upon the incentive to publish 
academic writings." 102 
d) The shrinking power of new licensing markets on the fair use doctrine 
In both the Texaco and Princeton cases the courts denied fair use to an activity that 
would have been likely to be classified as fair use in the past. According to a market 
failure analysis of the decisions, both cases support the argument that any copyright 
owner who can demonstrate that they have suffered, or are likely to suffer, a loss of 
licensing revenues as a result of a failure by a user of copyright material to obtain a 
copying licence will have a strong case for rebutting the defence of fair use. 
2 The White Paper is incorrect in its market failure analysis of fair use in the print 
world 
a) The limited effect of the Texaco and Princeton cases 
99 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), (en bane) cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997) . 
IOo 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), (first instance) per Ryan J. 
101 
( 1997) 117 S. Ct. 1336, 1387 (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930) . 
102 (1997)117 S. Ct. 1336, 1387 (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930). 
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The White Paper's reasoning that fair use will be replaced by a doctrine of "fared 
,, I 03 · b d th t · J r I 04 d p . I 05 · · · h use 1s ase on e percep 10n t rnt 1 exaco an nnceton , in reJectmg t e 
defence of fair use, did so on the grounds that the ability to license will always trump 
the presence of third party benefits. On a superficial view of the reasoning of the 
two cases, this might appear to be true. The cases involved research and educational 
uses. Yet, it is vital to make certain distinctions between various uses that are 
beneficial. A use can be beneficial in one of two ways. The beneficial use may be 
merely distributive, in the sense that it takes the information and distributes it to a 
greater audience. Alternatively, the use may be a transformative use, meaning that it 
also adds new content to the original information. 
A close analysis of Texaco and Princeton demonstrates that the uses involved were 
of the distributive type, a use which is rarely excused by the fair use doctrine. 
Distributive uses serve the important copyright policy interest of increased public 
access to copyrighted information. For instance, even though it did not receive fair 
use protection, 106 the copy shop in Princeton 
101 helped to broaden the audience for 
certain academic texts. Having assigned given readings to their students, the 
professors encouraged a wider distribution of the works in question. When it made 
the actual copies, the copy shop assisted in this process, 
108 even though it was not 
responsible for any of the creative content or the expressive message of the works. 
103 The term "fared use" refers to the implementation of online licensing systems. 
104 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
105 99 F.3d 1381 (6th cir. 1996), cert. denied, (1997) 117 S.Ct. 1336. 
106 See text below for a discussion of the effect of the high degree of commerciality of the particular 
use in this case. 
107 99 F.3d 1381 (6th cir. 1996), cert. denied, (1997) 117 S.Ct. 1336. 
108 Arguably, the use in Texaco had some distributive qualities as well. Certainly, Texaco 
was the end user. However, the copying did not directly facilitate this end use. Rather, the 
court emphasized that the copying was "a systematic process of encouraging employee 
researchers to copy articles so as to multiply available copies while avoiding payment." 
29 
Transformative uses, in addition to ensuring a wider audience, add new expressive 
content to the original. A recent Supreme Court case demonstrates the importance of 
creative uses of content. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, !nc. ("Campbefl") , 
109 the 
Court reviewed a rap group's use of the Roy Orbison song "Oh, Pretty Woman!" 
The group, (2 Live Crew), had created a comic version of that song. The band 
contacted Acuff-Rose, the holder of the copyright in the song, offering to pay 
royalties for its use. Acuff-Rose refused to grant a license for the use.
11 0 The Court 
extended fair use analysis to this situation, in large part because 2 Live Crew had 
fundamentally changed the original song and created a new expressive work. 
The Court ruled that the question of whether a use is transformative is central to any 
analysis considering "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.".
111 The Court 
explained that the purpose of the analysis of the above factor "is to see ... whether 
the new work ... adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."
11 2 Transformative 
works "lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within 
the confines of copyright." 113 Applying this test to the case at hand, the Court 
explained that parody "has an obvious claim to transformative value ... . [I]t can 
Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 920 (2d. Cir. 1995). In fact, the court concluded that "the predominant 
archival purpose of the copying tips the first factor against the copier .. .. " Texaco, 924. In 
essence, Texaco's system served to create several hundred mini-libraries of articles of 
interest to the 400-500 individual scientists. It distributed the work to the scientists. Further, 
the system served a directly commercial purpose of taking advantage of Texaco's sheer size 
to pay less per scientist in the copyright market. By comparison, fifty smaller firms, with 10 
research scientists each, would each have to order the entire set of journals in order to keep 
current in the field. 
109 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
IIO (1994) 510 us 569, 572-73. 
111 Above, nl 10,579. This is the first factor ofs 107 of the US Copyright Act. The New 
Zealand statutory equivalent is s43(3) of the Act. 
112 Above, nl 10, 579. 
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provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, 
creating a new one." 
114 The Court explained that the words in the infringing song 
"can be taken as a comment on the nai"vete of the original of an earlier day, as a 
rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement 
that it signifies." 
115 Focusing on the transformative value generated, as well as on 
the anti-dissemination motive inherent in this market, 
116 the Court held that the use 
of material from Orbison's original might indeed be protected as a fair use, even 
though the copying was obvious and for commercial gain. 
117 
The Supreme Court in Campbell reaffirmed the importance of transformation and 
provided a strong statement on the issue.
118 In the wake of Campbell, lower 
American courts have, in fact, relied heavily on the presence of transformative value 
to grant fair use. 11
9 Furthermore, those cases that deny fair use properly emphasize 
that there is little transformative value in the particular use at issue.
120 
113 Above, nl 10,579. 
114 Above, nl 10, 579. 
115 Above, nl 10,579. 
116 Above, nl 10, 580. 
117 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., (1994) 510 U.S. 569,585. The Court held that the parodic 
character of the use was protected. However, the Court remanded the case for the lower courts to 
examine the effect on the potential market for rap derivatives of the song. 2 Live Crew could not have a 
fair use to usurp that market. 
118 The Court was responding, in part, to requests for stronger guidance. The Court notes this Above, 
nl 10, 586. 
119 For instance, a US district court recently ruled that a parody can receive a fair use even if it appears 
in the form ofan advertisement. Leibowitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). The case involved a parody of the famous photograph of a nude and pregnant Demi Moore that 
appeared on the cover of the August 1991 issue of Vanity Fair magazine. Paramount Pictures created a 
photo of a pregnant woman's body in a similar pose with Leslie Nielson's head superimposed onto the 
body. Paramount used the photo to advertise its upcoming movie, Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this was an advertisement, the court justified a fair use "by returning to 
the core purpose of copyright: to foster the creation and dissemination of the greatest number of 
creative works." Above, Leibowitz, 1223. The court had found this purpose would be "best served by a 
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It also will be a relevant issue as to whether or not the use of the copyrighted 
material is for a commercial purpose or not. This inquiry is a part of the Copyright 
Act. The first statutory factor in s43 (3) of the New Zealand Act mandates 
consideration of "the purpose of the copying". Thus the court would have to consider 
whether such copying is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational 
purposes. The fourth statutory factor of the Copyright Act also points to this type of 
inquiry. A court is to examine "the effect of the copying on the potential market for, 
or value of, the work." 12 1 In the case of Television New Zealand Ltd v News monitor 
Services Ltd ("Television New Zealand") Justice Blanchard found that a fair use for 
the purpose of research and study did not encompass activities in which the material 
is simply copied and passed onto others for the commercial profit of the copier.
122 
Justice Blanchard commented that "a news monitoring business is parasitic. Why 
should it have a free ride on a broadcaster."
123 
Whether a use is commercial is also a material consideration for the US Courts. In 
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 
124 ("Sony") the 
Supreme Court indicated that the degree of commerciality of a given use may create 
finding that the highly transformative character of the Nielson ad trumps its admittedly commercial 
purpose." 
12° For instance, when the Sixth Circuit denied a fair use in Michigan Document Services, it stated that 
"the degree to which the challenged use has transformed the original copyrighted works ... is virtually 
indiscernible." Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs , 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 ( 6th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, (1997) 117 S.Ct. 1336. The court concluded that the copying bore "little 
resemblance to the creative metamorphosis accomplished by the parodists in the Campbell case." See 
also Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997). In the case the court denied 
a fair use to one television channel to broadcast another channel's tape of the Reginald Denny beating, 
when the user did not edit or transform the tape in any way, except to place its own call letters over the 
others. Even though this was a news broadcast, the complete lack of transformation weighed against 
fair use. See above. at 1122. This use was essentially a commercial distributive use. 
121 Copyright Act 1994 s43(3)(d). 
122 [1993] 27 IPR441, 465 . 
123 Above n 122, 466. 
124 (1984) 464 U.S. 417. 
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a presumption that a given use is or is not a fair use. 125 Even though the Court 
subsequently cautioned that one should not elevate the presumption to a general rule, 
it explained that the factor was one of many to consider.
126 In accordance with this 
idea, in both Texaco and Princeton, the courts relied on the commerciality of the use 
to deny fair-use protection. 127 
The White Paper argues that the presence of digital networks should change the fair 
analysis, just as similar efficiency advances have in other contexts. This reasoning is 
based on the view that the courts in Texaco and Michigan Document Services 
disallowed copying activities that would have received fair use protection twenty 
years ago. Notwithstanding the White Paper's view of those cases, a court should 
distinguish between distributive and transformative uses and between commercial and 
non-commercial uses before considering the effect of a seemingly more efficient 
market. 
If the use is distributive, then the court should more rigidly apply the presumption that 
a commercial use is not a fair use. The second-comer generates externalities that serve 
the public access part of the copyright balance. However, the expressive value is still 
entirely attributable to the original writer. If the second-comer can internalise the 
benefits, then he should share those with the author, in order to maintain the overall 
125 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1984) ("Although 
not conclusive, the first factor requires that 'the commercial or non-profit character of an activity' be 
weighed in any fair use decision. If the VCRs were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-
making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate 
here, however because [this was] a non-commercial, nonprofit activity." 
126 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., (1994) 510 U.S . 569, 585. 
127 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs ., (6th Cir. 1996) 99 F.3d 1381, cert. denied, 
(1997 )117 S. Ct. 1336, 1348 "What the publishers are challenging is the duplication of copyrighted 
materials for sale by a for-profit corporation that has decided to maximize its profits .. . and give itself a 
competitive advantage over other copyshops ... by declining to pay the royalties requested by the 
holders of the copyrights."); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., (2d. Cir. 1995) 60 F.3d 913, 
915 ("Texaco conducts considerable scientific research seeking to develop new products and 
technology primarily to improve its commercial performance in the petroleum industry."). 
33 
incentive structure. Furthennore, if the second-comer distributes an exact copy of the 
original, we can presume that the di stribution will adversely affect the market for the 
original and hence run afoul of the Copyright Act. 
On the other hand, if the use is highly transfonnative, then the user's ability to 
internalise the benefits is less important to the analysis.
128 If the user generates the 
positive externalities through her own creation of expressive content, then copyright 
policy is served when that party exploits her new content. For this purpose at least, in 
measuring the extent of the benefits generated, it makes no defensible difference 
whether the party acts for profit or for other motivation. This point was recognised in 
Newsmonitor. The High Court did not view the use of copyright material for research 
or study in a commercial setting as necessarily excluding the fair use defence. In 
obiter, Justice Blanchard stated: 
129 
... (S)o I conclude that a fair use for the purposes of research within s.19(1) can be something with a 
commercial end in view. 
Furthermore, the economic analysis can be criticised for being circular. That is, the 
analysis reduces to the proposition that if the use can be licensed, then its unlicensed 
use is not fair. 130 That formulation would allow copyright owners to define fair use, 
and that result makes no sense because fair use is supposed to be a limitation on 
copyright, not a marketing option for copyright owners. 
128 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., (1994) 510 U.S. 569,585. ("[T]he more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against 
a finding of fair use."). 
129 [1993] 27 IPR 441 at 463 . 
130 lbis point was made by the dissenting judge in Texaco v American Geophysical Union 60 F.3d 913 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
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b) The Texaco and Princeton cases should not be influential in the application of 
fair use on the Internet 
We should hesitate to extend the rationale of Texaco and Princeton to all instances 
of copying in digital markets. As discussed above, the defendants in both cases 
engaged in distributive copying activity. Furthermore, both cases involved highly 
commercial uses. Both cases fall into the type least deserving of fair-use treatment. 
Therefore, the White Paper is incorrect in its reasoning that the above cases support 
a market failure view of fair use. The Texaco and Princeton cases should not be 
treated as influential in deciding the role of fair use on the Internet given that it will 
be highly transformative uses that will be likely to be the prevailing uses on the 
Internet. 131 
C The White Paper's Application of the Market Failure Justification For Fair 
Use to the Digital World 
131 Jonathan Dowell, "Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital 
World, California Law Review", 7 (1998) 843, 849. 
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New technologies combined with the market failure doctrine have the potential, in 
theo,y, to modify "fair use" into fared use" 
According to the White Paper the rationale on which the court in Princeton and 
Texaco relied potentially has implications that extend far beyond the market for 
scientific and academic articles. In fact, in the view expressed in the White Paper, if 
there were some efficient way to link up every paragraph, every sentence, or every 
word with the content owner, the market failure rationale for fair use protection 
would largely disappear, even for highly transformative, non-commercial uses of 
information. The Internet could have precisely this effect. As Professor Goldstein 
has explained, digital environments "may reduce the transaction costs of negotiating 
licenses not only for complete works, such as journal articles, but for small 
fragments as well." 
132 Consequently, the White Paper predicts that because the 
contemporary fair use doctrine is predicated on a market failure rationale, and 
because an electronic exchange potentially eliminates this market failure for digital 
content, fair use law will significantly shrink, or an alternative basis for fair use will 
be rediscovered. 133 According to the White Paper online licensing institutions using 
new digital technologies may well obliterate the fair use defence entirely. Or, stated 
in another way, if the fair use defence arises only when transaction costs are 
132 See Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1994), at 223-
24. Professor Merges has described the effect of digital uses more generally: "If the market-making 
capacity of institutions such as the CCC makes such a dent in market failure, digital technologies will 
obliterate the fair use defense entirely." Robert P. Merges, "The End of Friction? Property Rights and 
Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce", 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 131 (1997)., at 
132. 
133 This is noted by Robert P. Merges, "The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce", 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 119 (1997). 
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prohibitive, the dramatic reduction in those costs will give the defence a very limited 
role in the future. 134 
2 The market failure justification is inappropriate when applied to fair use in a digital 
context 
Those who suggest that fair use will have a reduced role to play in the future predict 
that the Internet will allow the creation of a licensing market in which they can put 
coded information on-line and extract payments from most end-users with minimal 
transaction costs. This situation indicates that the copyright owners' access to users 
of copyrighted matter is relatively cost-free and the owner can now bargain with 
certain users, which certainly serves the incentive goal of copyright law. 
However, such digital licensing schemes will not produce perfect markets. 
135 Other 
imperfections can prevent certain users' participation in that same market, even when 
their uses would be beneficial to society. At least three types of market failure will 
persist in the digital market despite the emergence of new methods to license 
information. First, lingering bargaining costs will interfere directly with a content 
owner's ability to set up a market for fragments that is very efficient. Second and 
third, the presence of either externalities or anti- dissemination motives can interfere 
with a given user's capacity to produce socially efficient uses. 
134 Robert P. Merges, above n 133, 132. 
135 Admittedly, there will be some situations where transaction costs will be reduced on the Internet 
and accordingly copyright holders may justifiably be able to seek revenue in settings that might 
previously have been considered fair use. 
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a) Bargaining costs 
The first source of market failure for copying in a digital environment will arise from 
the difficulty inherent in the valuation of transfers of information. It will be very 
difficult for parties to agree on the exact cost of the information. In particular, it 
may be difficult to agree on how much should be paid for the use of small portions 
of information. This is illustrated in the example of a person writing an essay for an 
English course, who wishes to use a quote from Hunter S. Thompson's book The 
Rum Diary. It will be hard to say how much the use of the quote is worth to the 
person writing the article. For the purpose of this argument suppose that the user of 
the quote is willing to pay $ 10 to copy it. Even if only one paragraph is copied, the 
owner of the copyright will argue that the paragraph taken is the most valuable of the 
text, and that is why that paragraph has been chosen by the user. So the author will 
argue that the fair price is in fact much more than $10. Even if the user only want to 
use one sentence the copyright holder might still argue that the user has taken the 
most valuable sentence of the book and should be charged accordingly. The user 
may only have a budget of $100 for the entire article, 
136 and if $10 is too high a 
price for the use of the Hunter S. Thompson quote, then the quote will not be used at 
all. 
In theory, these parties could bargain to a resolution and agree on the cost of the use 
of the quote. The problem with this is that the bargaining costs will undercut 
precisely the presumed perfect market that the White Paper predicts will occur in the 
136 Admittedly, in practice there will be few first year English students who are willing to spend $100 
on essay writing materials. 
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digital medium. In practice, it is likely that not everyone will want to quote the 
same passage. In fact every fragmented copy will be different. If the contracting 
parties could agree on a simple formula for pricing use of the information, there 
would be no problem. For example, the parties might agree that the user should be 
charged one cent per word to copy. In reality, every transaction will be unique. As 
a result the bargaining parties will be unable to agree on some pre-determined 
formula results in a just price. 137 Therefore, bargaining costs will still remain in the 
digital realm. Consequently, the White Paper is wrong in its assumption that there 
will be a perfect market on the Internet. 
b) Externalities 
A second type of market failure results from the fact that a given user's willingness 
to pay may not reflect all the social benefits that flow from the use. 
138 
To ensure an 
efficient outcome, the bargaining parties must bear all the costs and reap all the 
benefits of the bargain. 139 If all the costs and benefits are not "internal" to the 
transaction, then the willingness of the parties to agree on a certain price will not 
necessarily reflect the true social value. Ideally everyone who will be affected by a 
137 One solution to this problem might be a blanket licensing scheme like those AS CAP ( or the CCC) 
provides certain users, under which the user buys the right to use any ASCAP works or any part 
thereof. Because the owners have aggregated the sources, the initial bargain will be much easier for the 
parties. Further, the parties need not repeat the negotiation wastefully. Unfortunately, such a solution is 
entirely theoretical and unlikely in the foreseeable future. The range of content and of content-
providers on the Internet is simply far too vast for any umbrella scheme. ASCAP, by comparison, only 
covers one aspect of the music copyright industry, and only some owners at that. Further, those owners 
are not always satisfied with ASCAP's imperfect payment schemes. Application of this model to the 
Internet is exceedingly difficult at best. That said, we should certainly try to encourage these more 
efficient mechanisms. To the extent that content owners actually have set up a system that removes the 
bargaining problem for a given class of users, courts should be sensitive to that fact. Subject to the 
further analysis suggested in this article. 
138 J. Dowell, "Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital World" 7 
(1998) Calif. L. Rev. 844, 846. 
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transaction should participate in the negotiations and any exchanges. However, 
where the potential beneficiaries or injured parties are numerous or geographically 
separated , the affected parties cannot possibly all sit down at the bargaining table to 
air their viewpoints.
140 In some instances, the parties will be able to internalise the 
costs and benefits. A typical way parties can internalise a copyright use is through 
commercial exploitation of that use. If the benefits are non-commercial, however, 
the copyright user may not be able to internalise them. In such a case, intractable 
market failure will develop. 
The example of the author who wishes to use the Hunter S. Thompson quote 
provides an illustration of how externalities can affect this market. The only parties 
to the potential transfer of the right to copy parts of Hunter S. Thompson's work will 
be the user and the copyright holder. However, the intended beneficiaries of the 
transaction will be the individuals who will read the article. Access to the Hunter S. 
Thompson quotes will enhance the literary article, and will add to the understanding 
and knowledge of those who read the article. Ultimately, this knowledge will be of 
benefit to society generally. The important question for the current analysis then 
becomes: can the user successfully "internalise" the potential benefits of the 
transfer? In the absence of funding from some source to pay for such materials, it 
139 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 102-03 (2d ed. 1997), 38-39. 
140 An archetypal example of this phenomenon is a power plant that produces pollution in a 
city. The potential beneficiaries of pollution controls are all the residents of the city who 
otherwise breathe the smog produced. But it would be entirely too costly to bring all of the 
residents to the bargaining table. See Cooter and Ulen above n 139, 99-100 ("Private 
bargaining is unlikely to succeed in disputes involving a large number of geographically 
dispersed strangers because communication costs are high, monitoring is costly, and 
strategic behavior is likely to occur. Large numbers of land owners are typically affected by 
nuisances, such as air pollution .... ") 
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can be assumed that the benefit will not be effectively intemali sed.
141 This is 
especi ally the case if the user is not in a pos iti on to recapture the benefit from society 
generally.
142 If the benefit is not effectively internalised, then the bargaining 
process will understate the actual value of the transfer to society. As a result the 
transfer will not occur, because the writer of the article will not pay the market price. 
Given these facts, the market has failed to produce the outcome that would best 
reconcile copyright's public and private goals. 
c) Anti-Dissemination Motives
143 
The third source of market failure in the market for digital information is the 
potential existence of anti-dissemination motives. Sometimes, a copyright owner 
will refuse to license a given use at a certain price for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the author's attempt to gain payment for her original creation of the work. 
Rather, the owner may simply not approve of the context in which the user places 
141 A theoretical solution to this problem would be for the university to have a fund to pay 
for uses of this sort. The idea would be that the members of society pay taxes ( or tuition) to 
the school that reflect the economic value the university will add to the community (or to 
their children). The university then can be an effective proxy for the community's interest. 
Even if the university has a fund, the idea that it could internalise the benefits down to this 
level is dubious. Like the copyrighted works themselves, education is a quasi-public good. It 
is non-rivalrous, and the benefits spread across society in a way that the provider cannot 
control. Consequently, like other public goods, each incremental source of education is 
systematically undervalued. For instance, without the rules that we have in place, a large 
segment of the population would not seek education past primary school. Consider the past 
experience of fann kids who stopped going to school after a certain age to help out on the 
fann. This behaviour reflected perfectly rational short-term behaviour for the parents, 
because they needed help immediately with the harvest. The fact that society generally lost 
the benefit of an educated population simply did not weigh heavily into the parents' decision. 
142 If the article was published in a journal or magazine, then the sales of the sales of the 
journal or magazine may make up the cost. However if the example concerned a first year 
English student, it would be unlikely that the cost could be made up through publishing. 
143 The argument for fair use in this type of situation is bound up with free speech ideals. However, th
e 
necessity of fair use is apparent even when speaking solely in economic terms. Due to New Zeala
nd's 
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the original. The content owner might object because the user writes a critical 
review, because the user parodies the original, 
144 because the author feels that the 
user recontextualises the original in an offensive way, 
145 or because the author 
simply does not like the user or the user's message.
146 In Campbell the Supreme 
Court forbade employing copyright law to achieve such censorship. It did not, 
however, expressly rule out using contract law to similar effect.
147 Mass distribution 
in conventional media does not lend itself to the imposition and enforcement of such 
anti-criticism contracts. By contrast, in the digital environment content owners have 
a greater opportunity to restrict access to the content through technology. Moreover, 
automated rights management technologies makes enforcing those contracts wholly 
viable from a technical point of view. 
Anti-dissemination motives are not in accordance with copyright policy. The 
copyright marketplace is designed to allow the creator to underwrite adequately the 
production of the content in question, not to censor downstream uses. The Campbell 
case, illustrates the manner in which anti- dissemination motives are a form of 
market failure. The rap ground 2 Live Crew approached the owners of the copyright 
for Roy Orbison's song Pretty Woman. However the license was refused as the 
parody was not approved of. The same result will occur if the copyright owner had 
simply asked for a larger amount of money in order to offset any discomfort on his 
lack of a Constitution that includes the right of free speech, anti-dissemination is only discussed i
n 
economic terms. 
144 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., (1994) 510 U.S. 569, 585. 
145 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). Dr. 
Seuss objected to defendant's use of elements of The Cat in the Hat in a satire, The Cat Not in the H
at, 
the subject of which was the 0.J. Simpson trial. The satire included such quips as: "One Knife? I Two 
Knife?/ Red Wife/ Dead Wife." Above, 1401. 
146 For example, if an writer wished to use a quote from a famous author, yet the owner of the 
copyright did not agree with the intended audience that the writer was aimed at, for example beca
use it 
was gay, or a certain race, or a certain sex, or was explicit. 
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part from the parody of hi s song. If the use of the original song is worth less that 
the 
amount which is being charged for the license, then the use will not go through , a
nd 
copyright goals suffer.
148 Consequently, it was held that band should receive fair-
use treatment. 
149 
The Court in Campbell did not rule that all parody merits free use. Rather, it held 
that the parodic character yielded a presumption that a certain degree of 
appropriation was acceptable. The Court explained that the content owner could 
protect its typical markets for license of the work. Acuff-Rose could enjoin 2 Live
 
Crew if the band infringed on the market for rap-based derivatives of "Oh, Pretty 
Woman!" However, Acuff-Rose could not protect the market for which it was 
unlikely to grant licenses, i.e., fully transformative parodies.
150 
Assumptions that any ability to license will increase efficiency ignore the 
147 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., (1994) 510 U.S. 569, 585 . 
148 Perhaps an analogy to property theory would be appropriate here. Some theorists ha
ve 
described property rights as being similar to sticks in a bundle. See Jeremy Waldron
, "From 
Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property" (
1993) 68 
Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 841, 884. ("A land "owner" has certain rights ("sticks") that 
come 
with being an owner. He may build on the land, he may live there, or he can mortgag
e it to 
secure a loan. But he does not control all the sticks. Rather, they are reserved for soc
iety. For 
instance, he may not use his land in a way that creates nuisances to his neighbours, a
nd he 
may not erect an unsound structure. He can sell all of these sticks he does control to 
another 
person, or he can sell some of them, but he may not bundle the sticks he does not ha
ve into a 
sale of the property.) 
The House Report on the US Copyright Act explained a similar phenomenon in the 
different 
area of copyright law. In some cases, copying by a non-profit organization might be
 fair use. 
However, "[i]t would not be possible for a non-profit institution, by means of contra
ctual 
arrangements with a commercial copying enterprise, to authorize the enterprise to ca
rry out 
copying and distribution functions that would be exempt if conducted by the non-pro
fit 
institution itself." H.R. Rep. No 94-1476, at 74 (1976). 
A copyright owner does not have the right to prevent dissemination of her work or to
 control 
the use to which others put it. Consequently, she should not import those concerns in
to a 
bargain with the result of driving up the price or preventing a transfer altogether. If s
he does, 
a court should allow a fair use so as not to stifle the dissemination and productive us
e of 
prior works. 
149 See Campbeli v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., (1994) 510 U.S. 569, 585. 
150 Above, n 149, 583. 
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complications that arise when a copyright owner wants to suppress certain uses. 
Creators only have a monopoly as part of a larger bargain to help create more 
expressive works. When the copyright owner attempts to control downstream uses, 
she wields her monopoly power to achieve effects other than those for which it was 
granted. An unfettered ability to demand a license fee destroys the balance in 
copyright between users and owners. 
The digital environment should not allow copyright owners to import anti-
dissemination motives into the digital environment. The digital market does nothing 
to offset the imperfections these motives generate. The increased efficiency of that 
market simply cannot force content owners to bargain only in the best interest of 
overall copyright policy. Anti- dissemination values have no more of a place on-line 
than they have in the print world. This is another aspect of market failure that the 
White Paper has failed to consider. 
D The Public Access Justification For Fair Use in the Print World 
1 The increased importance of the public access justification in the print world 
The White Paper's analysis centres on the market failure justification of fair use. 
However, there are other justifications explaining its existence.
151 One may view fair 
use not only as a concession to market failure, but also as a subsidy from the 
151 See Jessica Litman, "Reforming Information Law in Copyright's image", (1997) 22 Dayton L. Rev. 
589. 
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copyright owner in favour of uses that benefit the public. Fair use should apply where 
mechani cal enforcement of the copyright holder' s rights would grant the holder 
excessive control over non-copyrightable aspects of the work. As Samuelson 
states: 152
 
The notion that fair use rights apply only when no licensing market ex ists is neither historically 
accurate nor good public policy. It ignores some important free speech and related public interest 
functions of fair use that the Supreme Court has recognized on numerous occasions. 
Finding a rationale for fair use will become an increasingly important issue as 
copyright is reviewed due to the impact of digital technologies. Which justification is 
preferred will be of great significance. The public access justification is an alternative 
rationale for having fair use in the print world.
153 Under this rationale, fair use is an 
important device to ensure that information is both widely accessible, and may be 
freely communicated to the public. It provides a limit on the rights of copyright 
152 Pamela Samuelson, 'The Copyright Grab", Wired, Jan. 1996, at 138. 
153 Of course, there are many ways to think about fair use and many sets of terminology to 
explain its existence. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopying, and Computer Programs", (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 
( 1970) (using a slightly different type of market argument, Breyer argues that the copyright 
monopoly should extend just far enough to pay content creators enough to continue to create, 
and no further, with the consequence of allowing as a fair use any use that would fall short of 
driving the creator out of the business); Pierre N. Leval, "Toward a Fair Use Standard", 
(1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, focusing on the push for increased access and using 
decidedly less market-based terminology to explain the transformative benefits of certain 
uses); Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society", (1996) 106 
Yale L.J. 283, 288, 324-364 (analyzing copyright law and policy in terms of its democracy-
enhancing function: "[C]opyright is in essence a state measure that uses market institutions 
to enhance the democratic character of civil society"). 
Other commentators disagree with the current copyright framework in a more fundamental way. S
ee L. 
Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use", 40 Vand. L. Rev. I (1987). Professor Patte
rson 
examines the historical roots of copyrights and fair use. He argues that fair use arose only as a mea
ns of 
protecting certain infringing uses by business competitors. Above, 36-40. He posits that applicatio
n of 
fair use to ordinary consumers is wrong because those uses should not constitute infringement in th
e 
first place: "[T]hat an individual consumer's ordinary use, as by copying it, constitutes infringemen
t is 
not just nonsense, it is dangerous nonsense that is wholly contrary to the constitutional purposes of
 
copyright." Above, 46. 
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holders, and helps to maintain a balance between users and holders that is consistent 
with the underlying goals of copyright law. 
In the print world the public access justification of fair use is complemented by the 
idea-expression dichotomy. The idea-expression dichotomy refers to the fact that the 
Copyright Act does not protect pure ideas (the focal point of patent law) or facts 
(always public domain). Rather, it protects the particular way someone chooses to 
express a given idea. 154 The copyright framework consequently leaves open the 
possibility that someone else can also express the idea in a different way. Together, 
the idea-expression dichotomy and the public access function of fair use are 
limitations on the rights of copyright holders to control access to their work. 
The increased importance of the public access justification in the digital world 
It is one of the goals of copyright law to allow the public to have access to 
copyrighted works. However, in the digital environment access to 
information is threatened. This is because technological and contractual 
measures may be employed by copyright holders in order to prevent access to 
information on the Internet. As copyright holders move to disseminate 
material online, they will attempt to ensure that usage is governed by 
contractual terms in private transactions because of the extra protection 
154 Principles of reverse engineering can apply to traditional works such as literary works when in 
digital form. The process of research into a particular subject matter requires the browsing, reading and 
copying of other works, and often the incorporation of some of the ideas contained in those other works 
into the result of the research. Fair use currently extends to such a process, and thereby encourages new 
works to be created. 
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contractual rights will bring. 
155 As a result contract law may trump public 
access and override the traditional idea-expression dichotomy. This has been 
noted by Ginsburg who states that: 156
 
(F)rom the provider's point of view, contract may therefore prove a more attractive means of obtaining 
the same, or more, protection than that available under copyright law ... However, from the user's point 
of view, a contract regime, if it eludes user-rights available under copyright, drives a one-sided bargain 
for access to information, to the detriment of the balancing of rights set forth under copyright. 
The idea-expression dichotomy will no longer safeguard the public's access to the 
material that must be viewed in order to use ideas in new creative ways.
157 
Consequently, copyright holders will gain control over non-copyrightable elements 
of their work, which is inconsistent with the aims of copyright law. 
In light of this, it can be argued that it will be necessary for fair use
158 to take on a 
larger role to guarantee public access to information. Otherwise the copyright balance 
will swing too far the way of the copyright owners. 
3 The Competition Justification For Fair Use 
155 However it should be noted that potential problems may exist under contract and trade practices law 
when imposing harsh or unreasonable contractual terms in relation to information or copyright material 
deemed essential to the production of new good. 
156 Ginsburg J, "Surviving the Borders of Copyright", in WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Future 
of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, (Le Louvre Publishing, Paris, 1994), 224. 
157 This is the case without getting into any arguments about the distinction between ideas and their 
expression being too difficult to define for most judges, and arguably being a mere legal fiction See P 
Drahos "Copyright and Creativity in the Information Society", 
<http://www.ozemail.com.au/-cmmusic/cmm/drahosl.html> (last visited 7 August 2000). 
158 This paper does not deal with new rights of access created by legislation independent of copyright 
law. 
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a) The importance of fair use in encouraging competition in the print 
world 
A further justification for fair use is the encouragement of competition. 
It can be argued that unless there exists certain restrictions and exceptions 
to the copyright owner's monopoly, then anti-competitive conduct may flourish.
159 
Fair use encourages competitive activity by allowing for the use of copyright 
material in the development of new products, and in circumstances where the 
copyright owner may otherwise wish to restrict or prevent such use. Although there 
may be situations where trade practices legislation would provide a remedy in cases 
where, for example, a licence is refused, 
160 a right of fair use can also assist to 
ensure that for purposes where the public interest is sufficiently great there is a 
means of ensuring that access to information will be available. This justification for 
fair use is illustrated in the cases involving the concept of "reverse engineering". 
The process of reverse engineering is one method by which the expression of ideas 
can be extracted and then re-used in order to produce new goods. The US Court of 
Appeals in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.("Sega") the defendant Accolade 
developed and manufactured video games that could be played on a video game 
console marketed by plaintiff Sega. 
161 Sega developed games for the console and 
sold licenses to other software companies allowing development and production of 
games that were compatible with Sega's console.
162 Without obtaining a license, 
159 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright," (1989) 18 J. 
Legal Stud. 325. 
16° For example, the Fair Trading Act 1991. 
161 [1993] US App Lexis 782, 1520. 
162 The license included rights to Sega's copyrighted computer game code and the SEGA trademark. 
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Accolade produced games that were compatible with Sega's console. Accolade's 
development process required it to reverse engineer several Sega games to discover 
what was required to make its games compatible with the Sega console.
163 The 
games were analysed for their common features and these features were described in 
a manual. The manual only described the requirements to make the games 
compatible with the Sega console; it did not list the actual code. 
The court held that Accolade's reverse engineering of Sega's games was a fair use. 
Regarding the purpose and character of the use, the court noted that Accolade's use 
was commercial, but that the general presumption against a commercial use being a 
fair use "can be rebutted by the characteristics of a particular commercial use." 
164 In 
this case, the court considered that the copying done by Accolade was conducted to 
understand how to make games compatible with the system and not to copy any of 
Sega's games. 165 Also, under this factor the court stated that "we are free to consider 
the public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the fact that the 
alleged infringer may gain commercially." The court found the increase in 
independent games created for the Sega console and the creative effort required for 
those products were consistent with the intended effect of copyright law. 
166 For the 
nature of the work, the court discussed the difficulty in classifying computer 
programs as either an idea, which is not granted copyright protection, or an 
expression, meaning the expression of the idea, which is granted copyright 
protection. The court concluded that denying fair use applications of object code 
would essentially give the creator a "monopoly over the functional aspects of [the] 
163 Reverse engineering entails accessing the program's object code, which is the machine-readable 
binary language and converting it to source code, the programming language written by programmers 
and readable by humans. 
164 The court stated that the commercial aspect of Accolade's use was of "minimal significance." Above 
nl61, 1523. 
165 [1993] US App Lexis 782, 1520, 1522. 
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work--aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress."
167 
Therefore, this factor also weighed in favour of Accolade.
168 The amount copied 
weighed in favour of Sega because Accolade copied the entire program. However, 
this factor was given little weight, in light of the fact that Accolade's end product 
made Ii ttle use of the copied materials. 169 The Sega court next considered the effect 
Accolade's copying had on Sega's product market. The court stated that Accolade's 
games were different from Sega's and, given the nature of the video game market, it 
would not be unreasonable for a consumer to purchase, for example, a football game 
produced by each company. 170 The court recognised that Sega may suffer an 
economic loss from the competition, but characterised the loss as "minor." 
Moreover, by furthering creative expression, Accolade's use was consistent with the 
intent of copyright law. 171 Therefore fair use extends to the process ofreverse 
engineering, and thereby encourages new works to be created, leading to increased 
competition in the marketplace. 
However, in its analysis, the White Paper ignores the competition aspect of the fair 
use doctrine, choosing instead to view the Sega decision as further support for a 
market failure justification for fair use. 172 The approach of the White Paper conflicts 
with the actual facts of the case, and the reasoning of the court. Accolade chose not 
to pay for a license from Sega, despite the existence of a licensing scheme. Acco late 
instead decompiled an existing game in order to gain the same information. The court 
166 Above, nl65, 1523. 
167 Above, nl65, 1526. 
168 Above, nl65, 1526. 
169 See above nl65, 1526-27. 
170 See above nl65, 1523. 
171 [1993] US App Lexis 782, 1520, 1524. 
172 White Paper, 255. 
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b) 
found in favour of Accolade. The Sega case places major doubts over the a ertion 
contained in the White Paper that where there i a licensing scheme in place, it will 
replace fair use. This is because of the court's finding of fair use, even though a 
licensing scheme was in place. 
The increased importance of encouraging competition in the digital 
world 
Given the power that copyright holders will have to control access to information 
online through technological and contractual means, the role of fair use to 
encourage competition will be of even greater importance than it is in the print 
world. The process of research into a particular subject matter requires the browsing, 
reading and copying of other works, and often the incorporation of some of the ideas 
contained in those other works into the result of the research. Fair use currently 
extends to such a process, and thereby encourages new works to be created. There 
are no good policy reasons for it not continuing to do so. Hence, the encouragement 
of competition by fair use will be even more important to materials when in digital 
form. Again, the White Paper ignores this aspect of fair use. 
E The Impact of the DMCA on Fair Use in the Digital World 
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E The Impact of the DMCA on Fair Use in the Digital World 
1 The effect of the provisions of the DMCA 
The DMCA is inconsistent with the public access and competition justifications of the 
fair use doctrine. This part argues that although the DMCA does not state that it aims 
to destroy fair use online, that is precisely the effect its anti-circumvention provisions 
will have in practice. 
The DMCA is a legislative example of a further barrier to public access online. It 
contains anti-circumvention provisions, which are designed to assist content owners 
restricting access to their information. These provisions are intended to prohibit users 
from disabling the mechanisms created to block illegal access or copying.
173 The 
technological protection provision is split into two sections; first the circumvention of 
access controls 174 and secondly the circumvention of technological protection which 
protects a right of the copyright holder. 175 The access control provision is the one 
which has caused the controversy with regard to technological protection. It provides 
protection beyond that which is currently protected by copyright law. This is because 
accessing a work is not an exclusive right of the copyright holder. 
The problems involved with the interaction of this provision with the ability to make 
use of one's rights under the fair use doctrine are twofold. First, if a work is protected 
by such technological protection (the most popular view of how this is to be done is 
173 For example, music companies are developing digital watermarks which can be placed on digital 
recordings, to prevent second generation copies from being made. 
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by control of access by password or encryption), then it will be beyond the knowledge 
of most ordinary user to defeat such protecti on, which involves mathematical and 
computing skill s possessed only by those qualified in such fields. Secondly, this being 
the case, users will have to rely on the existence of manufacturers of circumvention 
devices, who will most probably face legal challenge from copyright owners, with the 
onus on them to prove that their devices have a substantial non-infringing use other 
than unauthorised circumvention, something which may be very difficult to establish. 
When this provision takes effect, and after the copyrighted protection technologies are 
in place, access will be significantly impaired. Instead of relying on a fair use defence, 
the alleged infringer will have to defend himself for violating the DMCA. Although 
the Act states that it is not intended to affect fair use, 
176 by cutting off access it seems 
that the anti-circumvention provisions are in conflict with fair use. 
What has also not been considered is the fact that with new technology, there will 
come associated new uses, and therefore new fair uses. This is a point which is 
demonstrated by Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios Inc. ,177 which highlighted the 
new fair use of time-shifting. The case concerned Universal and Disney's objections to 
the marketing of video cassette recorders (VCR's). They claimed that the VCR would 
damage their market in films, as instead of going to the cinema to see their films, the 
public would copy them off the air when they were shown on television. Sony 
contended that there was a substantial non-infringing use of the VCR for taping 
programmes while elsewhere or watching another channel, to be viewed later, known 
as "time-shifting". The court made a finding of fair use not because the substantial use 
174 17USCs.120l{a). 
175 17 use s.1201(b). 
176 "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright 
infringement, including fair use, under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 120l{c)(l). 
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of the VCR, time-shifting, did not have any appreciable effect on the market of the 
plaintiffs. The provision in the DMCA is very broad, and has the ability to prohibit 
new activities derived from the use of novel technology, which would otherwise be 
worthy of fair use protection. Thus, it has the potential to give even more wide 
ranging rights to copyright owners. 
The DMCA does make two concessions which are intended to provide for the 
continued application of fair use. First, the access control provision has been 
tempered by a clause which delays its implementation for two years. During this time, 
the Librarian of Congress shall "make the determination ... of whether persons who 
are users of a copyrighted work are ... adversely affected by the prohibition [ of 
unauthorised access J". 178 The point of this provision is to ensure that there is a 
consideration of the way in which the DMCA will affect the public's ability to use 
copyright works. 
Secondly, the DMCA states that both technological protection provisions are subject 
to the following provision, which states that: 
179 
Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright 
infringement, including fair use, under this title. (Emphasis added) 
This provision reaffirms the applicability of fair use even where a copyright work is 
protected by technological protection. Interestingly enough, the above section is the 
only section to mention fair use throughout the whole of the DMCA. These two 
177 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
178 17 USC s.120 I (a)(! )(C). 
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provi ions, although positive in theory, are subject to the findings of the Librarian of 
Congress, and also the willingness of the courts to interpret the law to allow the act of 
circumvention or the manufacture of devices whose primary use will be for the 
exercise of the fair use doctrine. 
The anti-circumvention provisions are also subject to seven specific exemptions for 
situations such as encryption research and law enforcement.
180 
Despite these minor concessions, the DMCA will have the practical effect of 
significantly narrowing the scope of fair use on the Internet. The DMCA makes 
major alterations to the fair use doctrine as it applies online. It can be argued that 
rather than preserving fair use, the DMCA narrows it from a broader principle to a set 
of Internet-specific exemptions, which goes against the fair use doctrine contained in 
the American Copyright Act, which has traditionally been left purposefully wide. 
Furthermore, the DMCA would, if it were to apply in New Zealand, narrow down 
the fair use provisions for research and private study. This goes against the general 
flexibility of the fair use doctrine as recognised by Lord Denning, who stated that it 
"is impossible to define what is "fair use". It must be a question of degree". 
181 As 
Cohen puts it: "as a practical matter, the DMCA will transform the fair use doctrine 
from a flexible common law safe harbour to a civil law system of narrow, specific 
exemptions to copyright." 
182 
179 DMCA, section 120l(c)(l). 
180 17 USC s.120l(d-j). 
181 Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 at 94. 
182 J. E. Cohen. "WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive?" 
(1999) E.l.P.R. 21 236-247 at 236. 
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The way in which this narrowing of fair use is achieved is without specific mention of 
fair use; the DMCA hardly mentions fair use at all.
183 However, the effect of the anti-
circumvention provisions is to restrict the fair use exemptions only to situations where 
the combination of technological protection and anti- circumvention law allow the 
right to be exercised.
184 For example, in situations where the act itself is not 
prohibited but the manufacturing of devices needed to perform that act are, then the 
effect is to prevent the act and therefore, if that act was in the pursuance of a fair use 
right, to narrow the fair use exemptions.
185 
The main problem with this approach is a lack of flexibility where it has been 
identified that flexibility is needed for the operation of the doctrine. It also presents 
problems concerning the "copyright bargain" that fair use is intended to maintain. 
The criteria of fair use are necessarily set forth in general terms. This has the effect of 
providing an appropriate balancing of the rights of creators, and the needs of users. 
The other concern relating to the use oflicensing has not been expressly dealt with in 
the provisions of the DMCA. The White Paper's argument that fair use will be 
inapplicable in lieu of licensing, is not specifically addressed in the DMCA. 
However, the narrowing of the fair use doctrine could mean that licensing will be 
used in situations which do not fall within the narrow exemptions contained in the 
DMCA. 
183 DMCA, s 1201 ( c )(1 ), is the only section which mentions fair use. 
184 See P. Samuelson, "The Copyright Grab" (January 1996) Wired, 4.01; 
http://www.wired.com.wired.archive 4.01 white.paper pr.html, where she argues that the 
anticircumvention provisions assumed that the American public were all thieves who would make 
unauthorised copies as a matter of course. 
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2 The DMCA represents an overcompensation against piracy in the digital world 
The approach of the DMCA appears to typify the attitude of some large copyright 
owners towards fair use; the prevailing view appears to be that fair use should only 
apply where there is no economic value in the work in question, 
186 and with the 
potential to be able to bill for even the smallest use of a work, the prevailing attitude 
is that any use that is not billed for is revenue lost. 
The balance in the DMCA is weighted against copyright users, and represents an 
overcompensation against illegal copying on the Internet. The Working Group has 
commented that "the ease of infringement and the difficulty of detection and 
enforcement will cause copyright holders to look to technology, as well as the law, for 
protection of their works ."
187 However, this is an overstatement on the part of the 
copyright owners and the authors of the White Paper. Although the rights of 
copyright owners are undoubtedly affected, the proposed alterations to the copyright 
law more than compensate for such discrepancies . 
188 
Because of the precedent-led way in which fair use has developed, there has been an 
element of flexibility in the operation of fair use (even when codified into statute it 
was as a list of broad principles). The DMCA and the White Paper will alter this 
position. If legislation such as the DMCA, or other implementations of the White 
Paper's recommendations, are passed in New Zealand, fair use will survive into the 
digital age, but in a lesser form. 
185 Mark Wing and Kirk, E., "U.S. Copyright Law Reform: Is a Balance Being Achieved," 
Intellectual Property Quarterly, [2000] Spring, 138, 143. 
186 Pamela Samuelson's quote of Bill Gates' assertion that "you don't need fair use: we'll give you fair 
use rights when you need them" illustrates this point. See "Does Information Really Want to Be 
Licensed?" <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu:pam/papers/acm 2B.html.> Last visited 15 August 2000. 
187 White Paper, 260. 
188 This is a view shared by those who analogise copyright with other forms of property, and view the 
copyright "glass" as half full, including the view that fair use results in potential loss on their behalf. 
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VIII ALTERNATIVES TO THE US APPROACH 
A The Copyright Balance Must be Maintained 
The interests of users will be compromised on the Internet if the White Paper's 
recommendations are followed. It has been contended that a better approach is not to 
unduly confine the fair use doctrine. Pamela Samuelson, a noted cyberlaw 
commentator, contends that fair use should be determined by the copyright scheme's 
goals rather than solely by publishers' economic interests.
189 She argues that 
continuity with past precedents is desirable because it provides users with guidance on 
acceptable norms ofbehaviour.
190 Samuelson advocates a concept of fair use that 
would allow a means to access information that is not already defined and limited by 
publishers. Others warn that increased protection for copyright owners would change 
the Internet into an information toll road or big cyber-mall, just as barren of 
educational and creative content as the pirate-ridden medium that copyright holders 
envision. 191 
The distribution of knowledge and learning is radically transformed by the Internet, 
189 P. Samuelson, "The Copyright Grab" (January 1996) Wired, 4.01; 
http://www. wired.corn.wired.archive 4.01. white.paper pr.html. 
190 P. Samuelson, above n189. 
191 R. N. Freed, "Comments on the Green Paper entitled 'Intellectual Property and the National 
Information Infrastructure"' (1995) Computer Law & Security Report 11(5) 234-243; L. A. Kurtz,
 
"Copyright and The National Information Infrastructure in the United States" (1996) E.I.P.R. 18(3
) 
120-126; B. Lehman, "Intellectual Property and the National and Global Information Infrastructur
es" in 
P. B. Hugenholtz, Kluwer Law International (1996), pp. 103-109; J. V. Mahon, "The Future of 
Copyright in a Digital Environment: A Commentary on Proposals for Copyright Protection on the
 
National Information Infrastructure" (1996) Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 22(1
) 
233-266. 
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partly through the ease of access (through "surfing" the Internet and the World Wide 
Web) and the ability to link previously disparate pieces of information and thus create 
a new understanding of the way knowledge is formed. The erosion of the dominance 
of central channels of distribution on the Internet gives users the unprecedented ability 
and impetus to create new works and thus add to the promotion of knowledge. The 
Internet's facilitation of cheap, easy, instant, widely dispersed, and decentralized 
access, publication, and communication is what makes the system so unique and 
unlike any other traditional media. Thus, users' rights advocates are concerned that 
overprotection of copyright holders' interests will suppress these essential 
characteristics and tum the Internet into yet another form of closed, one-sided media, 
similar to an electronic book. 
There are concerns that attempts to control user access through legal or regulatory 
means could result in excessive restriction that would sharply conflict with rights of 
individual freedom and the objectives of public education, ultimately subverting 
copyright's goals of access and dissemination of know ledge. 
192 For the Internet to 
fulfil its potential fair use must be maintained in order to ensure that the public can 
access information online. 
Advocates of users' rights contend that the current improvements in technological 
obstacles to access could create a situation where access to even public domain 
material may be functionally blocked by cumbersome licenses and onerous fees.
193 
This restriction of access and the corresponding diminution in the opportunity to gain 
192 See E. Kirk, "Encryption and Competition in the Information Society" (1999) I.P.Q. 37. 
193 J. V. Mahon, "The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment: A Commentary on Proposals for 
Copyright Protection on the National Information Infrastructure" ( 1996) Rutgers Computer and 
Technology Law Journal 22(1) 233, 241. 
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knowledge and learning may upset the traditional copyright balance. Supporters of 
users' rights would encourage a balancing of interests that would give them enough 
leeway to explore and properly develop the new forms of publishing and creating 
found on the Internet. There are a variety of means by which this can be achieved. 
B Fair Use should be Retained in the Digital World 
It is essential that in the current reform process, consideration is given to ensuring 
that equitable means of access and use of that content is permitted. Current fair use 
laws go some way towards ensuring that users may access and use copyright 
material in a print environment, and may have a similar role for information 
provided via networks. The ability of the public to access information will change in 
a digital environment. The above analysis shows that the idea/expression dichotomy 
cannot be relied upon in the digital environment to ensure ideas will always be in the 
public domain and freely accessible. Being able to use and re-work ideas contained 
within copyright material involves both access to the material, and the concomitant 
right to use at least some of what has been accessed. To a large extent, the public 
interest in the free access to ideas can be maintained through rights of fair use. A 
right of fair use may be the only legal means of obtaining access to material in 
digital form without a licence. 
C Reform Proposals 
1 Extending the scope of fair use to include the digital environment 
Legislation could be passed as a way of by-passing the Texaco and Princeton 
decisions. Some examples of the form such legislation could take are the American 
60 
Digital Clarification and Technology Education Bill of l 99i
94 and the Digital Era 
Copyright Enhancement Bill of 1997.
195 Both Bills contain provisions dealing with 
fair use. Both provide that in determining what is fair use, no independent weight is 
to be given to the means by which the material has been previously performed, 
displayed, or distributed by the author or the use of technological measures by the 
author to restrict access to the material. So, if the copyright owner has a licensing 
scheme in place together with technological restrictions to prevent access to the 
material, this does not, of itself, indicate that an unauthorised use will not be fair 
use. 196 This is one way in which the idea that the ability to license will trump the 
availability of the fair use defence, can be circumvented.
197 
2 Broadening the concept of fair dealing 
The approach that has been suggested by Sir Anthony Mason, in the Commonwealth 
Law Reform Commission Report on the Reform of Copyright Law 1
98
, in regard to 
the Australian fair use provisions, 
199 is to expand the concept of fair use and model it 
on the current US provisions. As discussed above, the factors of the US provision are 
very similar to those in section 43(3) of the New Zealand Act, but instead have 
general application without the categories that limit the circumstances of fair use 
under New Zealand law. Excluding the existing categories would have the benefit of 
allowing fair use to develop on a flexible case-by-case basis, with the judiciary 
194 Hr 2766. 
195 Hr 3048. 
196 Mark J Davison., "Australian proposals for copyright reform: some unresolved issues and some 
lessons from America", (1995) 6 Journal of Law and Information Science, 228, 236. 
197 As was arguably the finding of the American Courts in Texaco and Princeton according to the 
White Paper's interpretation of these decisions. 
198 The Australian Commonwealth Law Reform Commission's Report on the Reform of Copyrigh
t 
Law (1997). 
199 The Australian fair use provisions mirror the New Zealand provisions. 
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shaping the doctrine in its application to uses of new media. 
20° For example, this 
could justify distributive uses of copyrighted information given the reliance that will 
be placed on digital media for receiving and disseminating information. This would 
seem particularly appropriate in cases where no significant economic harm is suffered 
by the copyright owner. 
3 Changing fair use to an affirmative right 
It has been suggested that fair use should be changed to have an affirmative effect - ie 
to provide a right for users under copyright law, rather than solely as a defence to 
infringement. According to this view, rescinding that right in a license should not be 
possible, even though other rights may, with few exceptions, be waived by agreement. 
(ie subjecting mass market licenses to fair use conditions). 
4 Judicial expansion of the fair use doctrine 
Fair use's analysis could be extended beyond a mere consideration of the copier's use 
or the original work's content, to allow it to focus on the Internet medium itself. As a 
result, fair use would allow the Copyright Act to continue to provide the same 
protection to traditional writings, while offering a pocket of special consideration for 
the Internet. The most likely place to expand the fair use doctrine is the second 
200 Brudenall P, "The Future of Fair Dealing in Australian Copyright Law', (1997) Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology (TILT). <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/copyright/97/1 brud/>. (Last 
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consideration, " the nature of the copyrighted work. " Then a copier' s use could be 
distinguished on how the work is presented to the public. In Central District Court 
of California in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America the Court 
focussed on the " free broadcast nature of the copyright owner's dissemination of their 
copyrighted television programs." 20 1 The court is suggesting that the method by 
which the copyright holder chose to distribute its work to the public was a relevant 
consideration under the second factor. Stretching the fair use doctrine in such a way 
may be a judicially acceptable proposition. Applied to the Internet, thi s rationale 
would suggest that any authors who willingly place their copyrighted work on the 
Internet will be subject to having thi s action weighed against them in fair use's second 
factor determination. Because the five factors in the fair use analysis are to be 
balanced equally, a copyrighted work's existence on the Internet will be evaluated 
along with the other factors , such as publication status and factual-fictional nature. 
Therefore, the Internet user's success in the second factor will not automatically 
guarantee a finding of fair use. The advantage of this proposition is that it allows fair 
use to place the Internet on both sides of the balancing scale. An author who reaps the 
benefits of publicity which follow from placing their work on the Internet may be 
required to give back to the public via fair use's second factor. 
Another way judicial extension could happen is by expanding and adjusting the 
transformative use doctrine in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music. 202 The use is 
transformative if the secondary use adds value to the original material so that the work 
is transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights, or 
accessed 28 July 2000.) 
201 (1979) 480 F.Supp.429, 514. 
202 (1994) 510 U.S. 569, 590. 
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new understandings. These transforrnative activities as applied to the Internet could 
include such activities as displaying the work on the Internet and then creating a 
dialogue about it. To prevent the copyright holder's economic incentive from being 
devastated and to maintain the proper balancing of interests, transforrnative use 
would still have to be evaluated against the other four factors within traditional fair 
use analysis. 
D The Future of Fair Use Reform in New Zealand 
The key issue raised in the debate about the future of fair use on the Internet is whose 
interests should be served by copyright law online: those of copyright holders or 
users? Any approach which is chosen has a very difficult balance to achieve. Laws 
must be stringent enough to cope with the difficulties copyright holders face in the 
digital environment, but they also need to be fair to copyright users. The US 
approach favours copyright holders, and threatens to bring about an end to the fair use 
doctrine, as far as the Internet is concerned. This approach will not further the goals 
of copyright law. It will lead to public access being impeded, especially for those 
who cannot afford to pay licensing fees. As a result copyright holders will receive an 
incentive to create, however, copyright's goal of the advancement of public 
knowledge will not be fulfilled. 
In the reform process, the public good should be an important consideration. A more 
balanced approach to fair use is needed than the approach of the White Paper and the 
64 
D~1 . De -pitc any faults, the ab \ e reform options are preferable to the U ' 
approa has it cmTently stands. 
IX COJ\'CL SJOJ\' 
This paper began with a quote from Thoma Jefter on that empha i -ed the 
importance of the law keeping pace with technology. The White Paper al o starts 
with this quote, using to proclaim that the Internet ha "outgrown" the fair u c 
doctrine. It is submitted that in the rush to amend copyright law to keep up with the 
Internet, the original goals of the copyright cheme should remain the paramount 
consideration in any amendments to the la,,. In the process of amending fair use, 
the true rationale for the doctrine should be examined carefully. When the 
justifications of fair use are examined, it is clear that it should have a key role to 
play in ensuring the current balance between copyright holders and users is 
maintained. Advancements in technological protection will protect copyrighted 
works to a greater degree than what exists outside of the Internet; thus, fair use 
should be used as a counterweight to maintain the appropriate balance between the 
public and private interests. Whether this occurs in New Zealand will depend to a 
large degree on the global influence of the current US proposals. 
Thomas Jefferson states that it is no more sensible to let the law lag behind 
technology than it is to "require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a 
boy." 203 To follow the White Paper approach would be to throw away the "coat" of 
fair use, leaving copyright users out in the cold, when all that is needed is some 
alteration. 
203 White Paper, 1. 
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